The Role of Bargaining Power for Media Bias, Redlining in the IPTV Market, and Long Tail Economy in Online News

IF 0.4 4区 经济学 Q4 COMMUNICATION
N. Adilov, H. Martin
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The three articles in this issue of the journal analyze factors affecting the decisions of media firms. The first article studies how advertisers’ bargaining power and joint operating agreements influence media bias. The second article investigates factors affecting entry decisions into an Internet Protocol TV (IPTV) service market. The third article explores the role of long tail economy forces on revenue generating capability and the profitability of online news provision. The first article, “Media Bias When Advertisers Have Bargaining Power” by Wen-Chung Guo and Fu-Chuan Lai, constructs a theoretical model using a two-sided markets framework to analyze the degree of media bias under different model specifications. The first model specification assumes that there are two media firms and two advertisers that place their advertisements only in one of the firms (single-homing). Readers are assumed to have heterogeneous biased beliefs. The second model specification assumes that advertisers can place advertisements with both firms (multihoming). The third model specification assumes that media firms enter into joint operating agreements. The article finds that when advertisers have greater bargaining power, media bias and subscription prices increase. The main intuition for this result is that lower bargaining power on the media firms’ side reduces firms’ advertising revenue. To counteract this shortfall in revenue, firms try to increase their subscription revenue by selecting more biased positions that reflect readers’ beliefs, which reduces competition between the firms by increasing differentiation between the two media products. The authors also find that media bias increases under multihoming. On the other hand, the authors find that joint operating agreements reduce media bias. This is an interesting finding for joint-operating agreements because the number of agreements has been declining in the United States. “Diffusion of the New Video Delivery Technology: Is There Redlining in the Internet Protocol TV Service Market?,” by Sung Wook Ji, is an empirical study of AT&T U-verse’s recent decisions to offer IPTV services in different areas of the state of Indiana. Because Indiana does not have “built-out requirements” for new entrants, the entrant is not required to offer IPTV services throughout the entire state (franchise area). The author performs logistic
议价能力对媒体偏见的作用,IPTV市场中的红线,以及网络新闻中的长尾经济
本期杂志的三篇文章分析了影响媒体公司决策的因素。第一篇文章研究了广告主议价能力和联合经营协议对媒体偏见的影响。第二篇文章探讨了影响互联网协议电视(IPTV)服务市场进入决策的因素。第三篇文章探讨了长尾经济力量对在线新闻提供的创收能力和盈利能力的作用。第一篇文章《广告主拥有议价能力时的媒体偏见》,作者郭文忠、赖福川运用双边市场框架构建了一个理论模型,分析了不同模型规范下的媒体偏见程度。第一个模型规范假设有两家媒体公司和两个广告商,他们只在其中一家公司投放广告(单归巢)。读者被假定有不同的偏见信念。第二个模型规范假设广告商可以在两家公司都投放广告(多定位)。第三个模型规范假设媒体公司签订联合经营协议。文章发现,当广告主的议价能力增强时,媒体偏见和订阅价格会增加。这一结果的主要直觉是,媒体公司的议价能力较低,减少了公司的广告收入。为了抵消这种收入的不足,公司试图通过选择反映读者信仰的更具偏见的立场来增加订阅收入,这通过增加两种媒体产品之间的差异来减少公司之间的竞争。作者还发现,在多址情况下,媒体偏见会增加。另一方面,作者发现共同经营协议减少了媒体偏见。对于联合经营协议来说,这是一个有趣的发现,因为在美国,联合经营协议的数量一直在下降。新视频传输技术的扩散:互联网协议电视服务市场是否存在红线?,由Sung Wook Ji撰写,是AT&T U-verse最近决定在印第安纳州的不同地区提供IPTV服务的实证研究。由于印第安纳州对新进入者没有“建设要求”,因此进入者不需要在整个州(特许经营区域)提供IPTV服务。作者进行逻辑分析
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
9
期刊介绍: The Journal of Media Economics publishes original research on the economics and policy of mediated communication, focusing on firms, markets, and institutions. Reflecting the increasing diversity of analytical approaches employed in economics and recognizing that policies promoting social and political objectives may have significant economic impacts on media, the Journal encourages submissions reflecting the insights of diverse disciplinary perspectives and research methodologies, both empirical and theoretical.
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