Adapting NATO to Great-Power Competition

IF 1.2 3区 社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
H. Larsen
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Following Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO’s main challenge is to eliminate doubts about its strength and resolve to defend every inch of its territory, as stated in its recently published Strategic Concept, an authoritative document for the alliance’s strategic direction until 2030 (and beyond). By the Vilnius Summit in the summer of 2023, the alliance is set to complete the transition to a new NATO Force Model to deter Russian aggression. However, NATO’s adaptation to the military threat posed by Russia is complicated by the simultaneous need to factor in the rise of China. A rising China is stretching US military resources, and its technological clout creates vulnerabilities for a functioning defense alliance. These are vulnerabilities to which European NATO members must be especially attuned. While NATO as a whole faces the simultaneous need to adapt to the increased threat from Russia and the rise of China, this is a project whose success essentially depends on the European allies, whose defense and resilience are currently under stress. The good news for NATO’s cohesive power is that the invasion of Ukraine has seemingly shattered the alliance’s naïveté about being able to separate geopolitics from commercial interests in dealing with Russia, complementing a growing concern over the past six years or so about maintaining trade ties with an increasingly assertive China. Europe appears more united and more determined than ever to balance against illiberal powers threatening its security and values, and ready to do so as part of a larger transatlantic effort. To that end, this article seeks to make two major contributions to the debate over how Europe should
使北约适应大国竞争
在俄罗斯2022年2月入侵乌克兰之后,北约面临的主要挑战是消除人们对其实力的怀疑,并决心捍卫每一寸领土,正如其最近发布的《战略概念》所述,这是一份关于北约到2030年(及以后)战略方向的权威文件。到2023年夏天的维尔纽斯峰会上,北约将完成向新的北约部队模式的过渡,以阻止俄罗斯的侵略。然而,由于同时需要考虑中国的崛起,北约对俄罗斯构成的军事威胁的适应变得复杂起来。一个崛起的中国正在消耗美国的军事资源,而中国的技术影响力给一个运转良好的防务联盟带来了脆弱性。这些都是欧洲北约成员国必须特别注意的弱点。尽管北约作为一个整体同时面临着适应俄罗斯日益增加的威胁和中国崛起的需要,但这个项目的成功基本上取决于欧洲盟友,而欧洲盟友的防务和恢复能力目前正面临压力。对于北约的凝聚力来说,好消息是,入侵乌克兰似乎打破了该联盟在与俄罗斯打交道时能够将地缘政治与商业利益分开的naïveté,补充了过去六年左右对与日益自信的中国保持贸易关系的日益增长的担忧。欧洲似乎比以往任何时候都更加团结,也更加坚定地要制衡威胁其安全和价值观的非自由大国,并准备将其作为跨大西洋努力的一部分。为此,本文试图对欧洲应该如何应对的辩论做出两大贡献
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
5.90%
发文量
20
期刊介绍: The Washington Quarterly (TWQ) is a journal of global affairs that analyzes strategic security challenges, changes, and their public policy implications. TWQ is published out of one of the world"s preeminent international policy institutions, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and addresses topics such as: •The U.S. role in the world •Emerging great powers: Europe, China, Russia, India, and Japan •Regional issues and flashpoints, particularly in the Middle East and Asia •Weapons of mass destruction proliferation and missile defenses •Global perspectives to reduce terrorism Contributors are drawn from outside as well as inside the United States and reflect diverse political, regional, and professional perspectives.
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