Reasoning and cognitive control, fast and slow

Abstract

Influential ‘fast-and-slow’ dual process models suggest that sound reasoning requires the correction of fast, intuitive thought processes by slower, controlled deliberation. Recent findings with high-level reasoning tasks started to question this characterization. Here we tested the generalizability of these findings to low-level cognitive control tasks. More specifically, we examined whether people who responded accurately to the classic Stroop and Flanker tasks could also do so when their deliberate control was minimized. A two-response paradigm, in which people were required to give an initial ‘fast’ response under time–pressure and cognitive load, allowed us to identify the presumed intuitive answer that preceded the final ‘slow’ response given after deliberation. Across our studies, we consistently find that correct final Stroop and Flanker responses are often non-corrective in nature. Good performance in cognitive control tasks seems to be driven by accurate ‘fast’ intuitive processing, rather than by ‘slow’ controlled correction of these intuitions. We also explore the association between Stroop and reasoning performance and discuss implications for the dual process view of human cognition.