Failure Mode and Effect Analysis: An Application in Reducing Risk in Blood Transfusion

Jean Burgmeier RN (Coordinator of Organizational Learning and Development)
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引用次数: 131

Abstract

Background

In February 2001 Good Samaritan Hospital in Dayton, Ohio, conducted a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) on the blood transfusion process to reduce the risk of problems inherent in the procedure.

Developing the FMEA

The major steps of the analysis were to identify problems (failure modes), define their causes, and surmise the effects if failures occurred. Numerical scores were assigned for the likelihood of failure occurrence, the severity of the effects, and the possibility that the failure would escape detection. These scores were multiplied and reported as a risk priority number (RPN) for each failure mode. Solutions (process redesign actions) and monitoring plans (design validation) were developed to address the failure modes with the highest RPNs.

Presenting the FMEA

In March 2001 the FMEA document was presented to the Safety Board, which approved design changes such as use of a blood barrier system that restricts access to the blood until a patient-specific code is dialed.

Results

Measures were developed to analyze results, and rapid-cycle Plan-Do-Study-Act methodology was used to test and document redesign changes; most became the standard operating procedure. The new process accomplished its purpose of preventing serious, avoidable errors. No outcome errors occurred from March 2001 through June 2001 or in the 8 months following housewide implementation on June 18, 2001.

Discussion

FMEA was a valuable tool in error-trapping the blood transfusion process. Yet the FMEA process was time-consuming, tedious, and difficult and should be reserved for an organization’s highest-priority processes.

失效模式及效果分析:在降低输血风险中的应用
2001年2月,俄亥俄州代顿市的好撒玛利亚人医院对输血过程进行了失败模式和效果分析(FMEA),以减少输血过程中固有问题的风险。开发fmea分析的主要步骤是确定问题(失效模式),确定其原因,并在发生故障时推测其影响。对故障发生的可能性、影响的严重程度以及故障逃逸检测的可能性进行了数值评分。将这些分数相乘并报告为每个故障模式的风险优先级数(RPN)。制定了解决方案(流程重新设计行动)和监控计划(设计验证)来处理具有最高rpn的失效模式。2001年3月,FMEA文件提交给了安全委员会,安全委员会批准了设计变更,例如使用血液屏障系统,限制进入血液,直到拨出患者特定代码。结果制定了测量方法来分析结果,并使用快速循环的计划-执行-研究-行动方法来测试和记录重新设计的变化;大多数已经成为标准的操作程序。新程序实现了防止严重的、可避免的错误的目的。从2001年3月到2001年6月,以及2001年6月18日在全国范围内实施后的8个月内,没有出现结果错误。fmea是检测输血过程中错误的有效工具。然而,FMEA过程是耗时、乏味和困难的,应该保留给组织的最高优先级的过程。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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