The financial impact of 2012's quality incentive program

Robert Hootkins Jr.
{"title":"The financial impact of 2012's quality incentive program","authors":"Robert Hootkins Jr.","doi":"10.1002/dat.20613","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Now that the dialysis industry has been able to get acquainted with the first phase of the new bundled prospective payment system (PPS), it is time to prepare for the next phase of implementation, the quality incentive program (QIP). After a brief review of the PPS, specifics of the 2012 QIP will be presented, and, using historical performance projections, I will discuss the possible impact of the 2012 QIP on the hemodialysis industry.</p><p>H.R. 6331, the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) mandated that the Centers for Medicare &amp; Medicaid Services (CMS) implement a bundled rate payment system to replace the historical fee-for-service payment system.<span>1</span> Instead of the government paying separately for the individual components of a dialysis treatment, reimbursement will be a flat rate based on several patient metrics and a geographic wage component to account for cost of living variances. The positive financial incentives for providing more profitable drugs and services in the old fee-for-service model are now reversed, with all intravenous drugs now included, or “bundled,” into a single payment. Bundling has led to an expected decrease in drug utilization, particularly the most expensive injectable drug, erythropoietin (EPO). In the last year, Fresenius Medical Services has experienced over a 20% decline in EPO usage. With both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and CMS having concerns with patients obtaining less medication and subsequently developing severe anemia, CMS proposed a QIP that incorporates penalties for poor anemia management.</p><p>Beginning January 1, 2012, the first mandated QIP will impact dialysis facilities based on three quality metrics. All facilities that treat Medicare patients must obtain 2% or less of patients with average hemoglobin levels &lt;10 g/dL, 26% or less of patients with average hemoglobin levels &gt;12 g/dL, and 96% or more of patients with average urea reduction ratio (URR) of &gt;65%. Failure to meet these goals will result in a facility payment withhold for the subsequent year.<span>2</span> The three metrics (Hgb &lt; 10, Hgb &gt; 12, and URR &gt; 65%) will have weightings of 50%, 25%, and 25%, respectively.<span>2</span> A greater weighting was given to Hgb &lt; 10 to help ensure that patients will not be given too little EPO, which places the patient at risk for needing blood transfusions. For each 1% worse than the national average, the respective quality metric will lose one point out of ten.<span>2</span> Ultimately, summing the score for all three metrics leads to a score out of a possible thirty, which will determine if the facility will receive a 0-2% Medicare payment penalty (in half percent increments).<span>2</span> Based on the historical performances of dialysis facilities from 2007 utilizing the new scoring system, it is possible to estimate the projected financial impacts of the proposed QIPs on the industry and individual facilities for 2012.</p><p>Using the most recent dialysis facility compare data provided by CMS, one can estimate a financial loss of about $55.5M in 2012.<span>3</span> (Please be aware that drug utilization, facilities, patients, and patient outcomes have most assuredly changed since 2007, so these numbers are our best estimates at this moment.) This was forecasted by estimating 2012's industry average expected bundled rate of $267 revenue per treatment, a 1.9% increase from CMS's recently released 2012 End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Proposed Rule over 2011's estimated $264 revenue per treatment with 0.0% transition adjuster reduction, and multiplied by 144 expected hemodialysis treatments per patient per year.</p><p>Lastly, each facility's corresponding QIP penalty and patient volumes were included. (This includes CMS's allowed three-quarter year add-back of the 3.1% transition adjuster starting April 1, 2011 from CMS's reported 2010 proposed bundle rule data showing $256 industry average revenue per treatment rate.) Of the 4,713 facilities reporting all three quality metrics in 2007, this analysis suggests an average $12,000 reduction in Medicare payments per facility. Since 46.1% of facilities would have received no penalty based on their metrics, for those facilities that actually qualified for a reduction, the average penalty is closer to a $22,000 reduction in Medicare payments per facility. Alternatively, this equates to an overall $1.45 per patient per treatment reduction in Medicare payments over all facilities or a $2.65 reduction per patient per treatment penalty for the 53.9% of facilities that will actually qualify for a QIP penalty. Table I further breaks out the number of dollars, patients, and facilities that are tied to each penalty group.</p><p>As expected, the higher the percent QIP penalty, the lower the number of patients, treatments, and facilities in each penalty category; also, the higher the percent QIP penalty, the larger the financial penalty with the exception of the giant 0.5% penalty group.</p><p>The two largest providers, DaVita and Fresenius Medical Care (FMC), are responsible for less than half of the total QIP penalty, at approximately $26.5M, but represent over half of the industry's Medicare patients, with approximately 146,000 patients. This means that the QIP may put an increased burden on those smaller or individually owned facilities that cannot obtain large company efficiencies. Smaller providers absorbing a disproportionate negative financial bundle impact could lead to further and accelerated consolidation in the dialysis industry.</p><p>Further analysis of the facilities by each specific metric demonstrates that the Hgb &lt; 10 is the largest contributor to the QIP penalty estimate based on the 2007 data (Table II). This is not surprising, as CMS doubled the weighting of the Hgb &lt; 10 (50%) with respect to the Hgb &gt; 12 (25%) and URR &gt; 65 (25%) metrics. Table III expresses what would happen if all three quality metrics were weighted equally (33% each).</p><p>Even with equal weighting of all three metrics, the Hgb &lt; 10 metric remains the greatest contributor to the projected penalty. With CMS weighting the severe anemia metric more aggressively, this might be an effort to minimize costly blood transfusions.</p><p>On the high hematocrit side of the penalty range, Hgb &gt; 12, the bundle's impact of curtailing the use of ESAs by 20% is additive to the financial savings already afforded by promoting an additional penalty. This inherent double penalty due to the bundle and QIP should be reconsidered.</p><p>Fortunately, CMS has stated that they will be open minded in regard to adding to or modifying the QIP in 2013 and 2014. In CMS's 2012 ESRD Proposed Rule, CMS outlines the potential QIP for 2013 and 2014, with some major changes. In 2013, the QIP will remove the Hgb &lt; 10 metric completely and weight the remaining two, Hgb &gt; 12 and URR &gt; 65, at 50% each based on 2011 facility performance.<span>4</span> Removal of this metric was primarily because of CMS's inability to find a comfortable lower bound that was safe for all patients. While I agree with this stance, it seems that it would also be hard to justify an upper bound Hgb &gt; 12 using the same logic; different patients have different needs. CMS has acknowledged this and is asking for public feedback on the Hgb &gt; 12 metric for 2013.</p><p>The most dramatic change to the QIP will happen in 2014. The potential metrics released in the 2012 proposed rule for 2014's QIP may include a Kt/V metric, vascular access metrics, standardized hospitalization ratio (SHR) admission metric, a patient well-being metric, a bone mineral metabolism metric, blood stream infection metric, iron metric, and potentially others.<span>4</span> Unfortunately, we will have to wait for future rulings and data on what new quality metrics CMS will actually pick to see what the financial impacts may be.</p><p>The dialysis industry has enjoyed a high degree of government collaboration, which no other industry has achieved. While we have some basic outlines on what to expect in 2013 and 2014, future QIPs could see additional, fewer, or changed quality metrics depending on its success or failure in promoting quality in 2012 and future years. Whether QIP is perfect or not, hopefully we can learn from it through experience and improve upon it, thus improving patients' lives and health. Given the uncertainty about the 2014's QIP, my recommendation is to do what most, if not all, physicians already do: what is in the best interest of the patient. That way, if CMS chooses to add another quality metric, you will have the best chance for coming out ahead.</p>","PeriodicalId":51012,"journal":{"name":"Dialysis & Transplantation","volume":"40 9","pages":"382-384"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/dat.20613","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Dialysis & Transplantation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/dat.20613","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

Abstract

Now that the dialysis industry has been able to get acquainted with the first phase of the new bundled prospective payment system (PPS), it is time to prepare for the next phase of implementation, the quality incentive program (QIP). After a brief review of the PPS, specifics of the 2012 QIP will be presented, and, using historical performance projections, I will discuss the possible impact of the 2012 QIP on the hemodialysis industry.

H.R. 6331, the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) mandated that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) implement a bundled rate payment system to replace the historical fee-for-service payment system.1 Instead of the government paying separately for the individual components of a dialysis treatment, reimbursement will be a flat rate based on several patient metrics and a geographic wage component to account for cost of living variances. The positive financial incentives for providing more profitable drugs and services in the old fee-for-service model are now reversed, with all intravenous drugs now included, or “bundled,” into a single payment. Bundling has led to an expected decrease in drug utilization, particularly the most expensive injectable drug, erythropoietin (EPO). In the last year, Fresenius Medical Services has experienced over a 20% decline in EPO usage. With both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and CMS having concerns with patients obtaining less medication and subsequently developing severe anemia, CMS proposed a QIP that incorporates penalties for poor anemia management.

Beginning January 1, 2012, the first mandated QIP will impact dialysis facilities based on three quality metrics. All facilities that treat Medicare patients must obtain 2% or less of patients with average hemoglobin levels <10 g/dL, 26% or less of patients with average hemoglobin levels >12 g/dL, and 96% or more of patients with average urea reduction ratio (URR) of >65%. Failure to meet these goals will result in a facility payment withhold for the subsequent year.2 The three metrics (Hgb < 10, Hgb > 12, and URR > 65%) will have weightings of 50%, 25%, and 25%, respectively.2 A greater weighting was given to Hgb < 10 to help ensure that patients will not be given too little EPO, which places the patient at risk for needing blood transfusions. For each 1% worse than the national average, the respective quality metric will lose one point out of ten.2 Ultimately, summing the score for all three metrics leads to a score out of a possible thirty, which will determine if the facility will receive a 0-2% Medicare payment penalty (in half percent increments).2 Based on the historical performances of dialysis facilities from 2007 utilizing the new scoring system, it is possible to estimate the projected financial impacts of the proposed QIPs on the industry and individual facilities for 2012.

Using the most recent dialysis facility compare data provided by CMS, one can estimate a financial loss of about $55.5M in 2012.3 (Please be aware that drug utilization, facilities, patients, and patient outcomes have most assuredly changed since 2007, so these numbers are our best estimates at this moment.) This was forecasted by estimating 2012's industry average expected bundled rate of $267 revenue per treatment, a 1.9% increase from CMS's recently released 2012 End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Proposed Rule over 2011's estimated $264 revenue per treatment with 0.0% transition adjuster reduction, and multiplied by 144 expected hemodialysis treatments per patient per year.

Lastly, each facility's corresponding QIP penalty and patient volumes were included. (This includes CMS's allowed three-quarter year add-back of the 3.1% transition adjuster starting April 1, 2011 from CMS's reported 2010 proposed bundle rule data showing $256 industry average revenue per treatment rate.) Of the 4,713 facilities reporting all three quality metrics in 2007, this analysis suggests an average $12,000 reduction in Medicare payments per facility. Since 46.1% of facilities would have received no penalty based on their metrics, for those facilities that actually qualified for a reduction, the average penalty is closer to a $22,000 reduction in Medicare payments per facility. Alternatively, this equates to an overall $1.45 per patient per treatment reduction in Medicare payments over all facilities or a $2.65 reduction per patient per treatment penalty for the 53.9% of facilities that will actually qualify for a QIP penalty. Table I further breaks out the number of dollars, patients, and facilities that are tied to each penalty group.

As expected, the higher the percent QIP penalty, the lower the number of patients, treatments, and facilities in each penalty category; also, the higher the percent QIP penalty, the larger the financial penalty with the exception of the giant 0.5% penalty group.

The two largest providers, DaVita and Fresenius Medical Care (FMC), are responsible for less than half of the total QIP penalty, at approximately $26.5M, but represent over half of the industry's Medicare patients, with approximately 146,000 patients. This means that the QIP may put an increased burden on those smaller or individually owned facilities that cannot obtain large company efficiencies. Smaller providers absorbing a disproportionate negative financial bundle impact could lead to further and accelerated consolidation in the dialysis industry.

Further analysis of the facilities by each specific metric demonstrates that the Hgb < 10 is the largest contributor to the QIP penalty estimate based on the 2007 data (Table II). This is not surprising, as CMS doubled the weighting of the Hgb < 10 (50%) with respect to the Hgb > 12 (25%) and URR > 65 (25%) metrics. Table III expresses what would happen if all three quality metrics were weighted equally (33% each).

Even with equal weighting of all three metrics, the Hgb < 10 metric remains the greatest contributor to the projected penalty. With CMS weighting the severe anemia metric more aggressively, this might be an effort to minimize costly blood transfusions.

On the high hematocrit side of the penalty range, Hgb > 12, the bundle's impact of curtailing the use of ESAs by 20% is additive to the financial savings already afforded by promoting an additional penalty. This inherent double penalty due to the bundle and QIP should be reconsidered.

Fortunately, CMS has stated that they will be open minded in regard to adding to or modifying the QIP in 2013 and 2014. In CMS's 2012 ESRD Proposed Rule, CMS outlines the potential QIP for 2013 and 2014, with some major changes. In 2013, the QIP will remove the Hgb < 10 metric completely and weight the remaining two, Hgb > 12 and URR > 65, at 50% each based on 2011 facility performance.4 Removal of this metric was primarily because of CMS's inability to find a comfortable lower bound that was safe for all patients. While I agree with this stance, it seems that it would also be hard to justify an upper bound Hgb > 12 using the same logic; different patients have different needs. CMS has acknowledged this and is asking for public feedback on the Hgb > 12 metric for 2013.

The most dramatic change to the QIP will happen in 2014. The potential metrics released in the 2012 proposed rule for 2014's QIP may include a Kt/V metric, vascular access metrics, standardized hospitalization ratio (SHR) admission metric, a patient well-being metric, a bone mineral metabolism metric, blood stream infection metric, iron metric, and potentially others.4 Unfortunately, we will have to wait for future rulings and data on what new quality metrics CMS will actually pick to see what the financial impacts may be.

The dialysis industry has enjoyed a high degree of government collaboration, which no other industry has achieved. While we have some basic outlines on what to expect in 2013 and 2014, future QIPs could see additional, fewer, or changed quality metrics depending on its success or failure in promoting quality in 2012 and future years. Whether QIP is perfect or not, hopefully we can learn from it through experience and improve upon it, thus improving patients' lives and health. Given the uncertainty about the 2014's QIP, my recommendation is to do what most, if not all, physicians already do: what is in the best interest of the patient. That way, if CMS chooses to add another quality metric, you will have the best chance for coming out ahead.

2012年质量激励计划的财务影响
现在透析行业已经能够熟悉新的捆绑预期支付系统(PPS)的第一阶段,是时候为下一阶段的实施做准备了,即质量激励计划(QIP)。在简要回顾了PPS之后,将介绍2012年QIP的具体内容,并利用历史业绩预测,讨论2012年QIP对血液透析行业可能产生的影响。6331, 2008年医疗保险改善患者和提供者法案(MIPPA)要求医疗保险中心;医疗补助服务(CMS)实施捆绑费率支付系统,以取代传统的按服务收费支付系统政府不再单独支付透析治疗的各个组成部分,而是根据几个患者指标和考虑生活成本差异的地理工资组成部分,采用统一的报销率。在旧的按服务收费模式中,提供更有利可图的药物和服务的积极财政激励现在被逆转了,所有静脉注射药物现在都包括在内,或“捆绑”到一次付款中。捆绑已导致预期的药物使用减少,特别是最昂贵的注射药物,促红细胞生成素(EPO)。去年,费森尤斯医疗服务公司的EPO使用量下降了20%以上。由于政府问责局(GAO)和CMS都担心患者获得较少的药物并随后发展为严重贫血,CMS提出了一个QIP,其中包括对贫血管理不善的处罚。从2012年1月1日开始,第一个强制性的QIP将基于三个质量指标影响透析设施。所有治疗医疗保险患者的机构必须保证2%或以下的患者平均血红蛋白水平为10g /dL, 26%或以下的患者平均血红蛋白水平为12g /dL, 96%或以上的患者平均尿素还原率(URR)为65%。如果不能达到这些目标,将导致下一年的设施付款被扣留这三个指标(Hgb &gt; 10、Hgb &gt; 12和URR &gt; 65%)的权重分别为50%、25%和25%Hgb &lt; 10被赋予了更大的权重,以帮助确保患者不会被给予过少的EPO,这将使患者处于需要输血的风险中。每比全国平均水平差1%,相应的质量指标将在满分10分2分中失去1分最终,将所有三个指标的分数相加,得出一个满分为30分的分数,该分数将决定该机构是否将收到0-2%的医疗保险支付罚款(以0.5%的增量)基于2007年以来透析设施使用新评分系统的历史表现,可以估计2012年拟议的QIPs对行业和单个设施的预计财务影响。使用CMS提供的最新透析设施比较数据,可以估计2012年的经济损失约为5550万美元(请注意,自2007年以来,药物使用、设施、患者和患者结果肯定发生了变化,因此这些数字是我们目前的最佳估计。)2012年的行业平均预期捆绑率为每个治疗267美元,比CMS最近发布的2012年终末期肾病(ESRD)建议规则增加1.9%,比2011年估计的每个治疗264美元的收入(减少0.0%的过渡调节剂),并乘以每个患者每年144个预期血液透析治疗。最后,包括每个机构相应的QIP处罚和患者数量。(这包括CMS允许从2011年4月1日起,从CMS报告的2010年拟议捆绑规则数据显示,每个治疗费率的行业平均收入为256美元,从三个季度开始增加3.1%的过渡调整费用。)在2007年报告所有三项质量指标的4,713家机构中,这一分析表明,每家机构的医疗保险支付平均减少了12,000美元。由于46.1%的机构根据他们的指标不会受到惩罚,对于那些实际上有资格减少的机构,平均罚款接近每个机构的医疗保险支付减少22,000美元。或者,这相当于在所有医疗机构中,每位患者每次治疗的医疗保险支付总额减少1.45美元,或者在53.9%的医疗机构中,每位患者每次治疗的罚款减少2.65美元,这些医疗机构实际上符合QIP罚款的条件。表1进一步列出了与每个处罚组相关的美元、患者和设施的数量。正如预期的那样,QIP惩罚的百分比越高,每个惩罚类别的患者、治疗和设施的数量越少;此外,除了0.5%的巨额罚款组外,QIP罚款的百分比越高,经济罚款也越大。 两家最大的供应商DaVita和Fresenius Medical Care (FMC)承担的QIP罚款总额不到一半,约为2650万美元,但却代表了该行业医疗保险患者的一半以上,约有14.6万名患者。这意味着QIP可能会增加那些无法获得大公司效率的小型或个人拥有的设施的负担。较小的供应商吸收了不成比例的负面财务捆绑影响,可能导致透析行业进一步加速整合。根据每个特定指标对设施的进一步分析表明,Hgb &lt; 10是基于2007年数据的QIP惩罚估计的最大贡献者(表2)。这并不奇怪,因为CMS将Hgb &lt; 10(50%)的权重提高了一倍,相对于Hgb &gt; 12(25%)和URR &gt; 65(25%)指标。表III表示如果所有三个质量指标的权重相等(每个33%),将会发生什么。即使这三个指标的权重相等,Hgb &lt; 10指标仍然是造成预期惩罚的最大因素。随着CMS更积极地衡量严重贫血指标,这可能是减少昂贵输血的努力。在惩罚范围内的高血细胞比容方面,Hgb &gt; 12,减少20%的ESAs使用的捆绑影响是通过促进额外惩罚已经提供的财政节省的补充。由于捆绑和QIP造成的这种固有的双重惩罚应该重新考虑。幸运的是,CMS已经声明他们将在2013年和2014年对增加或修改QIP持开放态度。在CMS的2012年ESRD建议规则中,CMS概述了2013年和2014年潜在的QIP,并有一些重大变化。2013年,QIP将完全取消Hgb &gt; 10公制,并根据2011年的设施性能,对剩下的两个Hgb &gt; 12和URR &gt; 65进行加权,各占50%取消这一指标主要是因为CMS无法找到一个对所有患者都安全的舒适下限。虽然我同意这种立场,但似乎也很难用同样的逻辑来证明上限Hgb &gt; 12;不同的病人有不同的需求。CMS已经承认了这一点,并正在征求公众对2013年Hgb &gt; 12指标的反馈。QIP最戏剧性的变化将发生在2014年。2012年提议规则中发布的2014年QIP的潜在指标可能包括Kt/V指标、血管通路指标、标准化住院率(SHR)入院指标、患者健康指标、骨矿物质代谢指标、血流感染指标、铁指标,以及潜在的其他指标不幸的是,我们将不得不等待未来的裁决和数据,关于CMS将实际选择什么样的新质量指标,以了解可能产生的财务影响。透析行业享有高度的政府合作,这是其他行业所没有的。虽然我们对2013年和2014年的预期有一些基本的概述,但未来的qp可能会看到额外的、更少的或改变的质量指标,这取决于它在2012年和未来几年在提高质量方面的成功或失败。无论QIP是否完善,希望我们能够通过经验吸取教训,对其进行改进,从而改善患者的生活和健康。鉴于2014年QIP的不确定性,我的建议是做大多数(如果不是全部的话)医生已经在做的事情:最符合患者利益的事情。这样,如果CMS选择添加另一个质量度量,您将有最好的机会脱颖而出。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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Dialysis & Transplantation
Dialysis & Transplantation 医学-工程:生物医学
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