In Medias Res

IF 1.6 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Larry W. Yackle
{"title":"In Medias Res","authors":"Larry W. Yackle","doi":"10.1002/9781118351352.wbve1099","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"It's common in academic circles to distinguish between positive arguments (which describe things as they are) and normative arguments (which prescribe the way things ought to be). The distinction dissolves as soon as accounts of how the world works spill over into justifications for the status quo. That happens a lot, especially in discussions of theory. It happens again in David Strauss' wonderful monograph.1 Strauss offers a succinct exposition of the constitutional system we actually observe, coupled with a powerful explanation of how and why the scheme functions as it does and genuine reassurance that, on the whole, we can and should be satisfied.I am convinced Strauss has all this about right. In the main, I come to praise him. I will make this clear in Part I. We have a living Constitution. We make it up as we go along, according to a frame of reference that both enables and curbs our appetite for change and, into the bargain, holds us together as a people. I do have reservations about some aspects of his case, though, and I will sketch them in Part II. I also wonder what implications Strauss' theory may have for a purely normative question he doesn't address - namely, how an original document should be drafted for the purpose of fostering a living Constitution over time. I offer some thoughts along those lines in Part III.ILegal theorists can't muddle along like real people, operating within the constitutional system, never pausing to reflect on the whole of which they and their actions are a part. Theorists are supposed to explain stuff. They are supposed to connect the dots, or at least to try. Professor Strauss carries this burden as well as anyone writing in the field today. He imposes no deep philosophical concepts on the Constitution; he reads no contested political values into it. Instead, he offers a down-to-earth, objective, and above all wise appraisal of what we are doing and where we may be going. His analysis entails all the judgment, humility, and caution he associates with the common law method on which, in his view, we rely for the living Constitution.The first hundred pages of this book are a tour de force. Strauss initially identifies the challenges the Constitution poses for the evolving American society. He next demolishes the appeal of originalism as a plausible account of our national experience - originalism, at least, in any of its familiar forms. He then introduces common law methodology as a theoretical explanation that better fits the facts. His treatment is sophisticated, yet free of legal jargon (and distracting citations) that can discourage even serious readers. To make his case even more accessible to a general audience, Strauss illustrates the common law method at work in two celebrated contexts - the Supreme Court's incremental development of now-settled principles touching free speech and racial equality. This is a masterful academic achievement. I would not have dreamed that so much crucial ground could be covered so economically without sacrificing accuracy.IIPersuaded as I am by Professor Strauss' primary argument that we have a living, common law Constitution, I have some (modest) concerns about his additional arguments in chapter 5. There, he contends that the historical, documentary Constitution is \"as important as the living Constitution of precedents and traditions.\"2I must say I'm not sure how this can be so, given that common law methodology does the heavy lifting. Strauss plainly doesn't credit any notion that the written Constitution is entitled to respect because of its origins. With Jefferson, he dismisses any claim that we are bound to follow decisions made by somebody else a long time ago - because they were smarter than we are or because they asserted an authority to rule us centuries later. Certainly, Strauss rejects the idea that the document enjoys democratic bona fides. Even if the 1789 document was adopted democratically (it wasn't, of course, but even if it was), we would not be obliged to give it priority over a statute our own generation sees fit to enact. …","PeriodicalId":47323,"journal":{"name":"Boston University Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2012-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1002/9781118351352.wbve1099","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Boston University Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118351352.wbve1099","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

It's common in academic circles to distinguish between positive arguments (which describe things as they are) and normative arguments (which prescribe the way things ought to be). The distinction dissolves as soon as accounts of how the world works spill over into justifications for the status quo. That happens a lot, especially in discussions of theory. It happens again in David Strauss' wonderful monograph.1 Strauss offers a succinct exposition of the constitutional system we actually observe, coupled with a powerful explanation of how and why the scheme functions as it does and genuine reassurance that, on the whole, we can and should be satisfied.I am convinced Strauss has all this about right. In the main, I come to praise him. I will make this clear in Part I. We have a living Constitution. We make it up as we go along, according to a frame of reference that both enables and curbs our appetite for change and, into the bargain, holds us together as a people. I do have reservations about some aspects of his case, though, and I will sketch them in Part II. I also wonder what implications Strauss' theory may have for a purely normative question he doesn't address - namely, how an original document should be drafted for the purpose of fostering a living Constitution over time. I offer some thoughts along those lines in Part III.ILegal theorists can't muddle along like real people, operating within the constitutional system, never pausing to reflect on the whole of which they and their actions are a part. Theorists are supposed to explain stuff. They are supposed to connect the dots, or at least to try. Professor Strauss carries this burden as well as anyone writing in the field today. He imposes no deep philosophical concepts on the Constitution; he reads no contested political values into it. Instead, he offers a down-to-earth, objective, and above all wise appraisal of what we are doing and where we may be going. His analysis entails all the judgment, humility, and caution he associates with the common law method on which, in his view, we rely for the living Constitution.The first hundred pages of this book are a tour de force. Strauss initially identifies the challenges the Constitution poses for the evolving American society. He next demolishes the appeal of originalism as a plausible account of our national experience - originalism, at least, in any of its familiar forms. He then introduces common law methodology as a theoretical explanation that better fits the facts. His treatment is sophisticated, yet free of legal jargon (and distracting citations) that can discourage even serious readers. To make his case even more accessible to a general audience, Strauss illustrates the common law method at work in two celebrated contexts - the Supreme Court's incremental development of now-settled principles touching free speech and racial equality. This is a masterful academic achievement. I would not have dreamed that so much crucial ground could be covered so economically without sacrificing accuracy.IIPersuaded as I am by Professor Strauss' primary argument that we have a living, common law Constitution, I have some (modest) concerns about his additional arguments in chapter 5. There, he contends that the historical, documentary Constitution is "as important as the living Constitution of precedents and traditions."2I must say I'm not sure how this can be so, given that common law methodology does the heavy lifting. Strauss plainly doesn't credit any notion that the written Constitution is entitled to respect because of its origins. With Jefferson, he dismisses any claim that we are bound to follow decisions made by somebody else a long time ago - because they were smarter than we are or because they asserted an authority to rule us centuries later. Certainly, Strauss rejects the idea that the document enjoys democratic bona fides. Even if the 1789 document was adopted democratically (it wasn't, of course, but even if it was), we would not be obliged to give it priority over a statute our own generation sees fit to enact. …
在媒体界
在学术界,区分积极论证(描述事物本来的样子)和规范论证(规定事物应该是什么样子)是很常见的。一旦对世界运行方式的解释变成维持现状的理由,这种区别就会消失。这种情况经常发生,尤其是在理论讨论中。这在大卫·施特劳斯的精彩专著中再次出现施特劳斯对我们实际观察到的宪法体系进行了简洁的阐述,同时有力地解释了该体系是如何以及为何如此运作的,并真诚地保证,总的来说,我们能够而且应该感到满意。我相信施特劳斯说的都是对的。总的来说,我是来赞美他的。我将在第一部分阐明这一点。我们有一部活生生的宪法。我们在前进的过程中,根据一个既能促进也能抑制我们变革欲望的参照系,把我们作为一个民族团结在一起。不过,我确实对他的案例的某些方面有所保留,我将在第二部分中概述它们。我也想知道施特劳斯的理论对于一个他没有提到的纯粹规范性问题可能有什么含义——即,一份原始文件应该如何起草,以便随着时间的推移培育一个活生生的宪法。我在第三部分中提出了一些类似的想法。非法理论家不能像真正的人一样混日子,在宪法体系内运作,从不停下来反思他们和他们的行为是整体的一部分。理论家应该解释事物。他们应该把这些点联系起来,或者至少尝试一下。斯特劳斯教授和今天在这个领域写作的任何人一样肩负着这个重担。他没有给宪法强加深刻的哲学概念;他没有从中解读出有争议的政治价值观。相反,他对我们正在做的事情和可能要去的地方给出了一个实际的、客观的、最重要的是明智的评价。他的分析包含了他与普通法方法相关的所有判断、谦逊和谨慎,在他看来,我们赖以形成现行宪法的是普通法方法。这本书的前一百页是一部杰作。施特劳斯首先指出了宪法给不断发展的美国社会带来的挑战。接下来,他推翻了原旨主义作为对我们国家经验的合理解释的吸引力——原旨主义,至少,在其任何熟悉的形式中。然后,他介绍了普通法方法论,作为一种更符合事实的理论解释。他的论述是复杂的,但没有法律术语(和分散注意力的引用),即使是严肃的读者也会气馁。为了让普通读者更容易理解他的案例,施特劳斯在两个著名的背景下说明了普通法方法的作用——最高法院对现已确定的涉及言论自由和种族平等的原则的逐步发展。这是一项了不起的学术成就。我做梦也没想到,这么多重要的领域可以如此经济地涵盖而不牺牲准确性。我被施特劳斯教授的主要论点所说服,即我们有一个活生生的普通法宪法,我对他在第五章中的其他论点有一些(适度的)担忧。在那里,他认为,历史的、纪实的宪法“与由先例和传统构成的活生生的宪法一样重要”。我必须说,我不确定这是怎么回事,因为普通法的方法承担了繁重的工作。施特劳斯显然不相信成文宪法因其起源而受到尊重的任何观点。对于杰斐逊,他驳斥了我们必须遵循别人很久以前做出的决定的任何说法——因为他们比我们更聪明,或者因为他们在几个世纪后断言了统治我们的权威。当然,施特劳斯反对该文件享有民主善意的观点。即使1789年的文件是民主通过的(当然不是,但即使是民主通过的),我们也没有义务把它置于我们这一代人认为适合制定的法规之上。...
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
5.90%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Boston University Law Review provides analysis and commentary on all areas of the law. Published six times a year, the Law Review contains articles contributed by law professors and practicing attorneys from all over the world, along with notes written by student members.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信