{"title":"Social ties and related party transactions","authors":"Guang-Zheng Chen","doi":"10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2023.100577","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This study examines the effect of social ties between the chief executive officer (CEO)/chief financial officer (CFO) and independent board members on related party transactions (RPTs). The presence of CEO/CFO-board social ties can weaken board oversight and result in propping or tunneling activities. However, firms can benefit from a socially connected board’s advice. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, the results show that CEO/CFO-board social ties are positively associated with abnormal RPTs. This positive association is more pronounced for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially locally owned SOEs. Further analyses indicate that firms with socially connected boards engage in RPTs that are detrimental to shareholders. Additionally, the primary results seem to be largely driven by CEOs’ connections. Chinese regulators impose strict regulations on RPTs, directing firms toward transparent transactions. The results of this study, however, indicate that regulatory frameworks should be revised to account for the influence of social ties to protect minority shareholders’ interests.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":53221,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1061951823000563","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study examines the effect of social ties between the chief executive officer (CEO)/chief financial officer (CFO) and independent board members on related party transactions (RPTs). The presence of CEO/CFO-board social ties can weaken board oversight and result in propping or tunneling activities. However, firms can benefit from a socially connected board’s advice. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, the results show that CEO/CFO-board social ties are positively associated with abnormal RPTs. This positive association is more pronounced for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially locally owned SOEs. Further analyses indicate that firms with socially connected boards engage in RPTs that are detrimental to shareholders. Additionally, the primary results seem to be largely driven by CEOs’ connections. Chinese regulators impose strict regulations on RPTs, directing firms toward transparent transactions. The results of this study, however, indicate that regulatory frameworks should be revised to account for the influence of social ties to protect minority shareholders’ interests.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation publishes articles which deal with most areas of international accounting including auditing, taxation and management accounting. The journal''s goal is to bridge the gap between academic researchers and practitioners by publishing papers that are relevant to the development of the field of accounting. Submissions are expected to make a contribution to the accounting literature, including as appropriate the international accounting literature typically found in JIAAT and other primary US-based international accounting journals as well as in leading European accounting journals. Applied research findings, critiques of current accounting practices and the measurement of their effects on business decisions, general purpose solutions to problems through models, and essays on world affairs which affect accounting practice are all within the scope of the journal.