Common Venture Capital Investors and Startup Growth

IF 6.8 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Review of Financial Studies Pub Date : 2023-09-09 DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhad071

Ofer Eldar, Jillian Grennan

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We exploit the staggered introduction of liability waivers when investors hold stakes in conflicting business opportunities as a shock to venture capital (VC) investment and director networks. After the law changes, we find increases in within-industry VC investment and common directors serving on startup boards. Despite the potential for rent extraction, same-industry startups inside VC portfolios benefit by raising more capital, failing less, and exiting more successfully. VC directors serving on other startup boards are the primary mechanism associated with positive outcomes, consistent with common VC investment facilitating informational exchanges in VC portfolios.

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普通风险资本投资者和创业公司的成长

当投资者在相互冲突的商业机会中持有股份时，我们利用了交错引入的责任豁免，作为对风险投资(VC)投资和董事网络的冲击。在法律改变后，我们发现行业内的风险投资和在初创公司董事会任职的普通董事有所增加。尽管存在抽租金的潜力，但风险投资组合中的同行业初创公司受益于筹集更多的资金，更少的失败，更成功的退出。在其他创业公司董事会任职的风险投资董事是与积极结果相关的主要机制，这与促进风险投资组合中信息交流的常见风险投资一致。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Review of Financial Studies Multiple-

CiteScore

16.00

自引率

2.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Financial Studies is a prominent platform that aims to foster and widely distribute noteworthy research in financial economics. With an expansive editorial board, the Review strives to maintain a balance between theoretical and empirical contributions. The primary focus of paper selection is based on the quality and significance of the research to the field of finance, rather than its level of technical complexity. The scope of finance within the Review encompasses its intersection with economics. Sponsoring The Society for Financial Studies, the Review and the Society appoint editors and officers through limited terms.