Political colonization of a regulatory organization in a developing country: Implications for public accountability and organizational reform

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to investigate how politically based trade union power can determine the fate of a regulatory body's organizational reform and undermine public accountability in a purportedly democratic developing country (DC). A large regulatory organization in Bangladesh was examined as a case study to uncover how political actors and power were embedded in a World Bank (WB)-led organizational reform designed to contribute to public accountability and democracy. Interviews and media (newspaper) were utilized to identify the contestation of powers at macro- and micro-levels. The explanation of reform implementation was informed by New Institutional Theory and its derived concept of institutional logics. Finding that political recruitment of the organization's senior executives made it susceptible to the pressures of political agents, the study reveals how politically supported union actions interrupted a WB-led organizational reform that was seeking to secure democracy and public accountability. It finds that the pre-existing institutional arrangements resurfaced over time as the political agents secured more power to restore past practices that adversely impacted public accountability. The lack (absence) of accountability in a so-called democratic regime facilitated political interference with the regulatory governance and reforms that undermined organizational accountability to external stakeholders. The case-study organization's institutional environment, agents, and interests were unique situational conditioners that nonetheless may be relevant to other similar public accountability organizations in DCs. The findings of the paper have important implications for policymakers who design, implement, and evaluate public accountability reforms in DCs.