The tax advantage of public firms over private firms in the German household solid waste disposal industry

IF 2.5 4区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Marko Krause, Alexander Lahmann
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Abstract

We measure the tax advantage of public firms over private firms, which operate at municipality level in the German household solid waste disposal industry. Public firms with sovereign duties pay no taxes, but equivalent private firms have to. In a simple risk-free setting, we develop a measure of the percentage difference of the charges of both types of firms demanded under their respective tax treatments. We model a cost-covering public firm and a net present value maximizing private firm. For sensible model parameters from the German waste disposal industry the private firm has to demand an about 16% to 18% higher charge. The by far biggest impact on the measure has the value added tax, with revenues as a much larger tax base than profits. Tax savings, which directly affect pre-tax profits, only alleviate the disadvantage bit. There is some evidence that at least one type of private firms—that is, private law firms that are also majority privately owned, are productive enough to overcome the tax advantage of public firms and be able to charge a lower price than public firms.

Abstract Image

德国家庭固体废物处理行业中上市公司相对于私营公司的税收优势
我们衡量了公共公司相对于私营公司的税收优势,私营公司在德国家庭固体废物处理行业的市级运营。有主权关税的上市公司不纳税,但同等的私营公司必须纳税。在一个简单的无风险环境中,我们制定了一个衡量两类公司在各自税收待遇下所需费用百分比差异的指标。我们对一个成本覆盖的上市公司和一个净现值最大化的私营公司进行了建模。对于德国废物处理行业的合理模型参数,私营公司必须要求提高约16%至18%的费用。到目前为止,对该措施影响最大的是增值税,收入是比利润大得多的税基。节税直接影响税前利润,只会缓解一点劣势。有证据表明,至少有一种类型的私人公司——也就是大多数私人所有的私人律师事务所——的生产力足以克服上市公司的税收优势,并能够收取比上市公司更低的价格。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
12.50%
发文量
37
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