Managerial compensation and firm performance: The moderating role of managerial ownership and other governance factors

Abstract

This study looks at how executive compensation affects firm value and the extent to which this relationship is sensitive to managerial ownership and corporate governance factors. We use data from UK FTSE 100 firms for the period 2007–2012, generating a total of 578 firm-year observations. Consistent with optimal compensation theory, we find that the managerial compensation –firm value is more sensitive to executives’ ownership levels and other corporate governance indicators. Our results remain robust to alternative econometric models. We contribute to the literature on corporate governance and firm value . While the paper builds on the executive bonus compensation literature, it also furthers our understanding on the extent to which managerial ownership, institutional ownership, board size and non-executive ownership matter in the executive bonus compensation—corporate value relationship with specific emphasis on UK FTSE 100 firms. Our second contribution is related to the moderating role of managerial (executive) ownership. We show that as executives residual interests go up, managers become more conscious of the firm's idiosyncratic risk, and hence lessen their aggressive investment and financing strategies culminating in lower firm value.