Compensation regulation in banking: Executive director behavior and bank performance after the EU bonus cap

IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Stefano Colonnello , Michael Koetter , Konstantin Wagner
{"title":"Compensation regulation in banking: Executive director behavior and bank performance after the EU bonus cap","authors":"Stefano Colonnello ,&nbsp;Michael Koetter ,&nbsp;Konstantin Wagner","doi":"10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101576","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48438,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","volume":"76 1","pages":"Article 101576"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Accounting & Economics","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410122000994","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.

银行业薪酬监管:欧盟奖金上限后执行董事行为与银行业绩
作为2013年《资本要求指令IV》的一部分,限制高管可变薪酬的规定可能会影响欧盟银行业的高管流动、薪酬设计和风险承担。目前的研究发现,平均离职率明显较高,但也发现这是由业绩不佳的银行的首席执行官推动的。银行用更高的固定薪酬来抵消奖金上限,以此来补偿高管。尽管我们的证据只是暗示性的,但我们没有发现银行层面的风险承担有所减少,这是监管的一个据称目的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
8.70
自引率
6.80%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Economics encourages the application of economic theory to the explanation of accounting phenomena. It provides a forum for the publication of the highest quality manuscripts which employ economic analyses of accounting problems. A wide range of methodologies and topics are encouraged and covered: * The role of accounting within the firm; * The information content and role of accounting numbers in capital markets; * The role of accounting in financial contracts and in monitoring agency relationships; * The determination of accounting standards; * Government regulation of corporate disclosure and/or the Accounting profession; * The theory of the accounting firm.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信