The Structural Sources of Security Tension in Northeast Asia : Reconciliation Dynamics and the Effects of the Security-Status Dilemma

Abstract

Historical reconciliation has been an enduring problem in Northeast Asia and an oft-cited source of the “Asian paradox.” This article examines the varying degrees of reconciliation dynamics observed in the U.S.-Japan, China-Japan, ROK-Japan, and ROK-China dyads in order to provide a more systematic understanding of the “Asian paradox.” Contrary to the conventional wisdom that interstate reconciliation hinges upon a certain set of domestic and/or individual variables, this study posits that the process and outcome of reconciliation are determined by a particular set of structural tendencies exhibited in a dyadic relationship. More specifically, this article contends that the interaction of security and status dilemmas in the post-conflict stage can either foment or forestall reconciliation between former adversary states. Strategic incentives for reconciliation remain low when a dyad experiences a heightened sense of both security and status dilemmas; and the absence of both security and status dilemmas presents structural conditions ripe for meaningful reconciliation. Introducing a simple two-by-two model using the security-status dilemmas hypothesis, this article offers a parsimonious and generalizable theory on international reconciliation from a systemic perspective. Ranging from deep reconciliation (U.S-Japan) to no reconciliation (China-Japan), and shallow reconciliation (ROK-Japan) to latent reconciliation (ROK-China), the case studies illustrate the saliency of the security-status dilemmas model. The findings also suggest that the attendant “Asian paradox” can be construed as a byproduct of the divergent reconciliation dynamics observed in the region.