Costly Rewards and Punishments

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2019-09-17 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2018-0131

F. Lee

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract To punish an agent, the principal often incurs costs. I study a principal’s least costly reward and punishment scheme for an agent whose effort the principal cannot observe. I find the principal’s cost is sometimes minimized by using both costly rewards and costly punishments because (1) the agent has an outside option, or (2) a principal without commitment ability repeatedly interacts with the agent. I also find that when an agent’s effort is better at increasing the probability of a good outcome for the principal, the agent’s payoff may decrease, because the principal replaces rewards with punishments.

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代价高昂的奖惩

摘要为了惩罚代理人，委托人经常要承担费用。我研究了委托人对代理人的最低成本奖惩方案，而代理人的努力却被委托人忽视了。我发现，有时通过使用昂贵的奖励和昂贵的惩罚来最小化委托人的成本，因为（1）代理人有外部选择，或者（2）没有承诺能力的委托人反复与代理人互动。我还发现，当代理人的努力更善于增加委托人获得好结果的概率时，代理人的回报可能会减少，因为委托人用惩罚取代了奖励。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.