Mullā Ṣadrā on Intellectual Universal

Abstract

Following Avicenna, many Muslim philosophers and logicians have identified ‘intellectual universal’ (kullī ʿaqlī) with the very mental concept dependent on the mind. Apart from the controversies about Platonic Forms, they argue that they cannot be the very universals in logic. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentators have interpreted their view on intellectual universal in the Avicennian framework. In this interpretation, Mullā Ṣadrā has embraced Avicenna’s explanation about mind-dependent universal concepts; however, he has modified some details of the issue as per his theory of the primacy of existence and Plato’s theory of Forms. Having explained Sabzawārī and Ṭabāṭabā'ī’s interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view in his article, the author goes to propose a different interpretation according to which intellectual universals are identical with Platonic Forms, rather than the mind-dependent universal concepts. This Platonic interpretation is supported by three sets of evidences from Mullā Ṣadrā’s own texts. It also shows how Mullā Ṣadrā has answered Avicenna’s objection about the use of Platonic universal in logic.