Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry

IF 1.6 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
J. Frick
{"title":"Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry","authors":"J. Frick","doi":"10.1111/phpe.12139","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper sketches a theory of the reason-giving force of well-being that allows us to reconcile our intuitions about two of the most recalcitrant problem cases in population ethics: Jan Narveson’s Procreation Asymmetry and Derek Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem. I show that what has prevented philosophers from developing a theory that gives a satisfactory account of both these problems is their tacit commitment to a teleological conception of well-being, as something to be ‘promoted’. Replacing this picture with one according to which our reasons to confer well-being on people are conditional on their existence allows me to do better. It also enables us to understand some of the deep structural parallels between seemingly disparate normative phenomena such as procreating and promising. The resulting theory charts a middle way between the familiar dichotomy of narrow personaffecting theories and totalist or wide-person affecting theories in population ethics. 1. The Procreation Asymmetry Many of us hold pre-theoretical views about the morality of procreation that are, in an important sense, asymmetrical. Suppose you can foresee that a child you could create would live a life so full of uncompensated suffering as to be not worth living.1 Most would agree that – exceptional circumstances aside – it would constitute a serious moral wrong to bring this child into existence. That is, given a choice between Nobody: Create no new life and Misery: Create person A, with a life that is not worth living we believe that there is strong moral reason to choose Nobody over Misery. 1 More precisely, imagine that such a child would have a life that is, in Derek Parfit’s phrase, “worth not living”, since its life would be worse than a life spent in a permanent coma (which would also be not worth living). For stylistic reasons, I will continue to use the former locution. However, you may assume throughout that when I refer to a life as “not worth living”, this is also a life that is “worth not living”, in Parfit’s sense.","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2020-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/phpe.12139","citationCount":"17","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophical Perspectives","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12139","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17

Abstract

This paper sketches a theory of the reason-giving force of well-being that allows us to reconcile our intuitions about two of the most recalcitrant problem cases in population ethics: Jan Narveson’s Procreation Asymmetry and Derek Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem. I show that what has prevented philosophers from developing a theory that gives a satisfactory account of both these problems is their tacit commitment to a teleological conception of well-being, as something to be ‘promoted’. Replacing this picture with one according to which our reasons to confer well-being on people are conditional on their existence allows me to do better. It also enables us to understand some of the deep structural parallels between seemingly disparate normative phenomena such as procreating and promising. The resulting theory charts a middle way between the familiar dichotomy of narrow personaffecting theories and totalist or wide-person affecting theories in population ethics. 1. The Procreation Asymmetry Many of us hold pre-theoretical views about the morality of procreation that are, in an important sense, asymmetrical. Suppose you can foresee that a child you could create would live a life so full of uncompensated suffering as to be not worth living.1 Most would agree that – exceptional circumstances aside – it would constitute a serious moral wrong to bring this child into existence. That is, given a choice between Nobody: Create no new life and Misery: Create person A, with a life that is not worth living we believe that there is strong moral reason to choose Nobody over Misery. 1 More precisely, imagine that such a child would have a life that is, in Derek Parfit’s phrase, “worth not living”, since its life would be worse than a life spent in a permanent coma (which would also be not worth living). For stylistic reasons, I will continue to use the former locution. However, you may assume throughout that when I refer to a life as “not worth living”, this is also a life that is “worth not living”, in Parfit’s sense.
条件原因与生育不对称
本文概述了幸福感的理性力量理论,使我们能够调和我们对人口伦理学中两个最棘手的问题案例的直觉:Jan Narveson的生育不对称和Derek Parfit的非同一性问题。我表明,阻碍哲学家们发展出一种能令人满意地解释这两个问题的理论的是,他们对幸福的目的论概念的默许,这是一种需要“推广”的东西。把这张照片换成一张照片,根据这张照片,我们赋予人们幸福的理由是以他们的存在为条件的,这让我做得更好。它还使我们能够理解生育和有希望等看似不同的规范现象之间的一些深层结构相似之处。由此产生的理论在人口伦理学中常见的狭义影响人理论和整体主义或广义影响人理论之间划出了一条中间道路。1.生育不对称我们中的许多人对生育道德持有理论前的观点,在重要意义上是不对称的。假设你能预见到,你能创造的一个孩子的生活充满了无偿的痛苦,以至于不值得活下去。1大多数人都会同意,抛开特殊情况不谈,让这个孩子存在是一种严重的道德错误。也就是说,在《无名之辈:不创造新生活》和《悲惨世界:创造一个人a》之间做出选择,对于不值得过的生活,我们相信选择《无名之徒》而不是《悲惨世界》是有充分道德理由的。1更准确地说,想象这样一个孩子的生活,用Derek Parfit的话来说,“不值得活下去”,因为它的生活会比永久昏迷的生活更糟糕(这也不值得活下来)。出于文体上的原因,我将继续使用前一句话。然而,你可能会一直认为,当我把一种生活称为“不值得活”时,在Parfit的意义上,这也是一种“不值得过”的生活。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信