Implications of the 2022–2023 Situation in Ukraine for Possible Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia

Abstract

ABSTRACT The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, and the ongoing (as of this writing) conflict that has followed, has prompted many of the actors responsible for determining military and nuclear weapons strategy and policy to rethink their approaches. In Northeast Asia the combinations of the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, tensions over Taiwan, and other regional disputes with the lessons of the Ukraine conflict have caused the nations of the region that have nuclear weapons, and those that do not but are covered under the US “nuclear umbrella”, to at least consider changes in how nuclear weapons might be deployed and, as a final resort, used. These actors include the United States, China, Russia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. This article compiles and summarizes the opinions of experts from or on each of these nations as to how the Ukraine conflict may influence perception of the utility and possible uses of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. The paper evaluates common changes in perception caused by the Ukraine conflict across the nations of the region, as well as differences, and notes the possible ways in which national changes in perception due to the Ukraine conflict may combine to make the danger of nuclear weapons use in the region even more serious than it has recently been. This article is based on work in the Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA).