The History and Political Economy of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.

Erika Lietzan
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Reform of the Hatch–Waxman generic drug framework is in the air. Scholars, consumer advocacy groups, regulated industry, and policymakers are engaged in heated debate about perceived shortcomings in the scheme, flaws, and unexpected loopholes. Changes in how the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implements the law, as well as changes to the law itself, are under serious consideration. These policymaking discussions take place against a backdrop of shared assumptions about the origins and nature of the original Hatch–Waxman legislation — assumptions that this Article claims are wrong. Convention wisdom holds that the Hatch–Waxman legislation was a delicate compromise privately negotiated and endorsed by the affected industries — and one that benefitted both sides. When the law is viewed through the lens of public choice theory, however, the truth is more nuanced, and the balance of benefits and costs different. By design the benefits would largely flow to one group, the generic companies, while the costs would be borne by the other group, the innovating companies. The public stood to both gain (earlier access to cheaper drugs) and lose (reduced flow of innovative drugs, if economic models were accurate). Its interests were championed by a legislative entrepreneur (Henry Waxman) as well as Public Citizen, however, which focused on the gain rather than the loss. The economic interests of the generic companies, which invested heavily in passage of the legislation, aligned with the interests of Public Citizen, and the combination of their forces made passage inevitable. Curiously, there have been few published histories of the Hatch–Waxman Amendments since the accounts written contemporaneously by participants in the policymaking process. Scholars, third–party opinion–shapers, and policymakers considering reform proposals need a clearer understanding of the history and the constraints under which the Hatch–Waxman Amendments were in fact brokered. This Article steps into the gap by offering a contextualized history of the statute and describing its political economy.
哈奇-瓦克斯曼修正案的历史与政治经济学。
哈奇-瓦克斯曼仿制药框架的改革正在酝酿之中。学者、消费者权益倡导团体、受监管行业和政策制定者正在就该计划中的缺陷、缺陷和意外漏洞展开激烈辩论。美国食品药品监督管理局(FDA)实施该法律的方式以及法律本身的修改正在认真考虑之中。这些政策制定讨论是在对哈奇-瓦克斯曼原始立法的起源和性质的共同假设的背景下进行的——本条声称这些假设是错误的。传统观点认为,哈奇-瓦克斯曼法案是一项由受影响行业私下谈判和认可的微妙妥协,对双方都有利。然而,当从公共选择理论的角度来看法律时,真相更加微妙,利益和成本的平衡也有所不同。按照设计,收益将主要流向一个集团,即通用公司,而成本将由另一个集团——创新公司承担。公众既可以获得(更早地获得更便宜的药物),也可以失去(如果经济模型准确的话,创新药物的流量会减少)。然而,它的利益受到了立法企业家(亨利·瓦克斯曼饰)和公共公民的支持,他们关注的是收益而不是损失。在立法通过过程中投入巨资的普通公司的经济利益与公众公民的利益相一致,它们的力量相结合,使立法通过成为必然。奇怪的是,自决策过程参与者同时撰写账目以来,哈奇-瓦克斯曼修正案的出版历史很少。学者、第三方舆论塑造者和考虑改革提案的政策制定者需要更清楚地了解哈奇-瓦克斯曼修正案的历史和制约因素。这篇文章通过提供法规的背景历史并描述其政治经济来填补这一空白。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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