Is Non-Nuclearization Sustainable? Explaining South Korea’s Strategic Choices

Abstract

A nuclear armed-state enjoys enormous benefits in world politics including near-absolute security, security policymaking autonomy and independence, heightened international bargaining power, and a high probability of emerging victorious in disputes with non-nuclear states. Given the abundant benefits, it is understandable that non-nuclear states would desire to become nuclear. In particular, when a state is threatened by an enemy armed with nuclear weapons, the desire to be similarly nuclear-armed for the sake of its own survival increases substantially. Although it has not yet received (and will probably never receive) international recognition, North Korea has recently emerged as a de facto nuclearweapon state after multiple rounds of nuclear and ballistic missile tests. Despite these circumstances, South Korea has announced that it will remain nonnuclear and continue to rely on the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States for its security, a puzzling decision given the growing nuclear threat from the north. During the recent US-ROK (Republic of Korea) summit in April 2023, South Korean president Yoon Suk-yeol “reaffirmed the ROK’s longstanding commitment to its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty” and “to the U.S.-ROK Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.” Given high domestic demand for nuclear weapons in South Korea and the serious threat that Pyongyang poses, as well as the nuclear technology and resources that Seoul already possesses, its decision to remain