Rahel Freiburghaus, A. Vatter, Isabelle Stadelmann‐Steffen
{"title":"Kinder, gentler – and crisis-proof? Consensus democracy, inclusive institutions and COVID-19 pandemic performance","authors":"Rahel Freiburghaus, A. Vatter, Isabelle Stadelmann‐Steffen","doi":"10.1080/01402382.2022.2156164","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Which patterns of democracy perform best? Although a decades-long research tradition has fairly robustly suggested that consensual democracies outperform their Westminster-style majoritarian counterparts, the scope of previous studies has been limited to ‘normal times’. In this article, the endogenous context of the COVID-19 pandemic is leveraged to study whether the alleged superiority of consensualism also holds during crises. It is hypothesised that, in addition to consensus democracy, inclusive institutions – i.e. cabinet size and interest-group corporatism – enhance crisis-related performance. Drawing on new and original data, cross-sectional and hierarchical time-series regression analyses show that horizontal power-sharing and the number of ministers substantively reduced excess mortality, while the structure of the interest-group system had no effect. Although established consensus democracies can draw on their built-in institutional assets even during crises, our findings indicate that majoritarian systems may, as a compensatory performance-enhancing tool, flexibly gear up for crisis-induced necessities by adding more ministers to the cabinet.","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":"46 1","pages":"1106 - 1132"},"PeriodicalIF":4.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"West European Politics","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2156164","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
Abstract Which patterns of democracy perform best? Although a decades-long research tradition has fairly robustly suggested that consensual democracies outperform their Westminster-style majoritarian counterparts, the scope of previous studies has been limited to ‘normal times’. In this article, the endogenous context of the COVID-19 pandemic is leveraged to study whether the alleged superiority of consensualism also holds during crises. It is hypothesised that, in addition to consensus democracy, inclusive institutions – i.e. cabinet size and interest-group corporatism – enhance crisis-related performance. Drawing on new and original data, cross-sectional and hierarchical time-series regression analyses show that horizontal power-sharing and the number of ministers substantively reduced excess mortality, while the structure of the interest-group system had no effect. Although established consensus democracies can draw on their built-in institutional assets even during crises, our findings indicate that majoritarian systems may, as a compensatory performance-enhancing tool, flexibly gear up for crisis-induced necessities by adding more ministers to the cabinet.
期刊介绍:
West European Politics (WEP)has established itself as one of the most authoritative journals covering political and social issues in Western Europe. It has a substantial reviews section and coverage of all national elections in Western Europe. Its comprehensive scope, embracing all the major political and social developments in all West European countries, including the European Union, makes it essential reading for both political practitioners and academics.