Max Weber’s “Value Polytheism”: Contexts, Origin, Logical-methodological Foundations

Abstract

Weber’s concept of “vocation” in science implies “anti-monumentalism”: research can always be continued, and the results obtained can be used in various ways. The scientist cannot be completely aware of the final impact of their work, so they are faced with a paradox of consequences. This paradox is based on value polytheism, a concept put forward by Weber. There are two ideas central to polytheism: first, one must recognize the internal logic of value spheres and, second, one must consider their fundamental incommensurability. But how does this idea emerge in Weber’s theory? Interpretations of value polytheism as a “fact” of a cultural situation and as the logical foundation of science do not allow one to answer the question of its origin. The conceptual bridge is found in Weber’s sociology of religion. Tenbruck’s, Schluchter’s, and Hennis’s models are examined to identify variations of value polytheism. However, their macro-orientation does not demonstrate the internal structure and functioning of polytheism. The present paper explicates the logical-methodological foundations of Weber’s scientific programme to clarify these points. Primarily, it investigates the problem of the consequences of an action carried out in a “vocation” mode and the boundaries of “adequate” causal explanations as presented in Weber’s works. It makes it possible to consider Weber’s value polytheism and concepts associated with it not as value metaphysics or unreasonable axioms,but as a methodologically based conceptual apparatus.