The Binary Path of Risks in Pension Systems and Political Pressure

Abstract

In this paper, we offer an explanation for cyclical reforms to pension systems, based on the experience of countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the last three decades. We conclude that in making the transition to funded pension design, governments not only transfer longevity and fiscal risks to the individual but also absorb risks transferred from the public, with each market actor transferring undiversifiable risks to the other. This pathway of hidden risks, which has not previously been discussed in the literature, stems from a public expectation that citizens will enjoy risk premiums and adequate old-age benefits, an expectation that evolves into political pressure. The outcomes of this risk path are realized in financial transfers, such as means-tested social security and minimum pension guarantees. Consequently, funded pension designs converge naturally into a new landscape paradigm of risk-sharing, with intergenerational and intragenerational components. Financial crises such as the one accompanying the recent COVID-19 pandemic foster the convergence process.