Inviting submissions to the Special Issue on trust and vulnerability (Deadline 31 August 2024)

Abstract

Trust implies vulnerability, as stated by various scholars across disciplines (Baier, 1986; Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Some of the most cited definitions (e.g. Mayer et al. (1995) and Rousseau et al., 1998) contain the crucial idea that the essence of trust is an acceptance of vulnerability based on positive expectations. As Bigley and Pearce (1998, p. 407), reviewing earlier work, observe: ‘When the terms “trust” and “distrust” have been evoked in the social sciences, they almost always have been associated with the idea of actor vulnerability.’ Scholars in other disciplines such as philosophy (e.g. Baghramian et al., 2020), economics (e.g. James, 2002), education (e.g. Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, 1998), medicine (Barnard, 2016), and theology (Bruni, 2021) also define trust in the light of vulnerability. Finally, behavioural conceptualizations of trust imply risk-taking and thereby incurring vulnerability, as trusting might not be reciprocated or even allows the other party to do harm (Dasgupta, 1988; Luhmann, 1979). While vulnerability is recognised as a conceptual cornerstone in trust research, few authors delve into detailed explanations of how they specifically utilise and qualify the concept. To further complicate, fundamental controversies concerning vulnerability in trust research remain unresolved. Some researchers, for instance, view vulnerability as a deliberate decision influenced by factors like perceived trustworthiness (e.g. Mayer et al., 1995), while others, following Deutsch (1958), see vulnerability as an existential awareness of the inherent risks in relationships, which is essential for the subsequent development of trust. In this vein, the acknowledgment of ‘being at somebody’s mercy’ is a prerequisite for trust to emerge. Hence, whether we perceive vulnerability as an existential condition or as a deliberate state, its relationship with trust—whether it precedes or follows trust—should significantly influence the way we advocate for trust, model it, and measure it. However, this matter has received limited attention. With our fundamental criticism, we of course acknowledge the few notable exceptions. For instance, Misztal (2011) examines vulnerability as both a condition and outcome for trust proposing three types of vulnerability. Nienaber et al. (2015) distinguish between active vulnerability and passive vulnerability, and Weibel et al. (2023) explore vulnerability as a condition for trust and differentiate various types of active trusting based on the specific vulnerability involved. While these studies offer valuable insights, much of the existing trust research tends to be superficial in qualifying vulnerability, and at worst, it opens itself to fundamental critique. It begs the question: What is the value of trust research if it fails to address the core underlying issue of vulnerability with greater precision and depth? In addition to lacking more sophisticated conceptualizations, mainstream trust research has poorly addressed the empirical experience of vulnerability and how individuals succeed or fail to accept it within the context of trust. Only a few studies have specifically examined the perception and management of vulnerability and relational risk in practical settings (Searle et al., 2016; Siegrist, 2021; Tsui-Auch & Möllering, 2010). Incorporating insights from fields that are often overlooked in trust research would provide much-needed additional understanding. For example, psychodynamics offers a comprehensive exploration of vulnerability, development, and trust through rich phenomenological studies (e.g. Corlett et al., 2021). Furthermore,