Single- and Double-Elimination Tournaments under Psychological Momentum

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2021-10-25 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2019-0187

Bo Chen, Xiandeng Jiang, Zijia Wang

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract This paper studies the effects of “psychological momentum” on strategic behavior in single- and double-elimination tournaments. We show that in presence of both positive and negative momentum a single-elimination tournament elicits a higher total effort than that of a double-elimination tournament if and only if the positive momentum is insignificant and the negative momentum is significant. Regardless of momentum effects, a single-elimination tournament elicits a higher average effort per match than a double-elimination tournament does.

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心理动力下的单双淘汰赛

摘要本文研究了单淘汰赛和双淘汰赛中“心理动力”对策略行为的影响。我们证明，在存在正动量和负动量的情况下，单淘汰赛比双淘汰赛获得更高的总努力，当且仅当正动量不显著而负动量显著时。不管动量效应如何，单淘汰赛每场比赛的平均努力比双淘汰赛要高。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.