{"title":"A Safer Catch? The Role of Fisheries Management in Fishing Safety","authors":"Lisa Pfeiffer, Tess Petesch, Thamanna Vasan","doi":"10.1086/716856","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Commercial fishers are constantly exposed to many risk factors, making it a dangerous occupation. Fisheries management that limits access and catches can give rise to well-known stock and rule-of-capture externalities knownas the “race tofish.”Thismarket failuredissipates rents andcan leadfishers to takeonadditional risks such as fishing in poor weather, overloading vessels, or delaying maintenance to outcompete others. Rights-based management is expected to reduce the incentives to take on additional risk. Using a large dataset of fishers from around the United States, we empirically estimate the effects of individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs on one important risk factor: the decision to fish in poor weather. We find that risk-taking behavior generally decreases under IFQs, but themagnitudeof the shift differs by fishery, andweexplore potential drivers of these differences.","PeriodicalId":49880,"journal":{"name":"Marine Resource Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Marine Resource Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/716856","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Abstract
Commercial fishers are constantly exposed to many risk factors, making it a dangerous occupation. Fisheries management that limits access and catches can give rise to well-known stock and rule-of-capture externalities knownas the “race tofish.”Thismarket failuredissipates rents andcan leadfishers to takeonadditional risks such as fishing in poor weather, overloading vessels, or delaying maintenance to outcompete others. Rights-based management is expected to reduce the incentives to take on additional risk. Using a large dataset of fishers from around the United States, we empirically estimate the effects of individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs on one important risk factor: the decision to fish in poor weather. We find that risk-taking behavior generally decreases under IFQs, but themagnitudeof the shift differs by fishery, andweexplore potential drivers of these differences.
期刊介绍:
Marine Resource Economics (MRE) publishes creative and scholarly economic analyses of a range of issues related to natural resource use in the global marine environment. The scope of the journal includes conceptual and empirical investigations aimed at addressing real-world oceans and coastal policy problems. Examples include studies of fisheries, aquaculture, seafood marketing and trade, marine biodiversity, marine and coastal recreation, marine pollution, offshore oil and gas, seabed mining, renewable ocean energy sources, marine transportation, coastal land use and climate adaptation, and management of estuaries and watersheds.