Inštrumentálna normativita naturalizovanej epistemológie

IF 0.2 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Martin Nuhlíček
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The paper concerns the fundamental debate whether naturalized epistemology is or can be normative. Following the example of W. V. Quine, if we replace the philosophical theory of knowledge with a psychological description of cognitive processes, we may not be able to identify “correct” processes of cognition and thus determine epistemic norms. A group of authors (L. Laudan, H. Kornblith and others) consider epistemic norms as hypothetical imperatives connecting cognitive means with cognitive ends. Such instrumental understanding of normativity is compatible with the naturalistic picture of epistemology. However, the key question concerns cognitive ends: are there any universal ends, or do we have to be satisfied with relativism of norms? In the paper, we defend the thesis that the ultimate end of knowing is “truth”. If we understand epistemic norms as hypothetical imperatives that prescribe how we should acquire beliefs in order to achieve our needs and interests, then we can define “truth” as that factor that makes certain processes successful with respect to these ends. It is a neutral understanding of truth as a criterion for the “correct” (functional) performance of the cognitive system. Orientation to truth thus forms the common value of the successful pursuit of any particular goals, thereby avoiding relativism of norms. At the same time, this understanding provides a more definite content to Quine’s concept of normativity as “truth-seeking technology” aimed at making accurate predictions.
自然主义认识论的工具规范性
本文关注的是自然化认识论是否规范或是否可以规范的根本争论。以奎因为例,如果我们用对认知过程的心理描述来取代哲学知识理论,我们可能无法识别“正确”的认知过程,从而确定认知规范。一组作者(L.Laudan、H.Kornblith和其他人)认为认知规范是连接认知手段和认知目的的假设性命令。这种对规范性的工具性理解与认识论的自然主义图景是一致的。然而,关键问题涉及认知目的:是否存在普遍的目的,或者我们必须满足于规范的相对主义?在这篇论文中,我们为认识的最终目的是“真理”这一论点进行了辩护。如果我们将认识规范理解为假设的必要条件,规定我们应该如何获得信念以实现我们的需求和利益,那么我们可以将“真理”定义为使某些过程在这些目的方面取得成功的因素。它是对真理的中立理解,是认知系统“正确”(功能)表现的标准。因此,对真理的取向形成了成功追求任何特定目标的共同价值,从而避免了规范的相对主义。同时,这种理解为奎因的规范性概念提供了更明确的内容,即旨在做出准确预测的“求真技术”。
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来源期刊
FILOZOFIA
FILOZOFIA PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.40
自引率
66.70%
发文量
31
期刊介绍: Filozofia publishes original articles in a wide range of areas including metaphysics, epistemology, history of philosophy, social and political philosophy, philosophy of mind, ethics, philosophy of religion and related disciplines. The journal is published monthly, with the exception of July and August, i.e. ten issues yearly. The articles are accepted in Slovak, Czech and English languages.
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