Comitology and Delegation System in the European Union

IF 0.1 Q4 AREA STUDIES
N. Kaveshnikov
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The article addresses the system of comitology and delegation in the European Union. It explores such issues like evolution of comitology, contemporary procedures of the control over the European Commission in the process of elaboration of implementing and delegated acts, preferences of legislators regarding control procedures, factors determining the final choice among these procedures. The article shows that the system is based on the “police patrol” model.Should we consider the comitology / delegation procedures as a mechanism of control or discussion (deliberation)? This question is of the greatest theoretical interest. The purpose of this article is to show based on the existing empirical studies, the actual preferences of EU institutions when choosing the procedures of comitology/delegation and the factors influencing the final decision. The article demonstrates that both prior to and after the Lisbon Treaty, the preferences of institutions in choosing procedures differ significantly and can be largely explained by the goal of maximizing their own influence. An empirical analysis of the results of the final choice of procedures demonstrates that the main factors that push toward stricter control procedures are institutional conflict and the complexity of the issue under discussion. These preferences and factors of the choice of procedures allow to conclude that the EU institutions consider the system of comitology and delegation primarily as a mechanism of control over the Commission in the logic of the principal-agent theory.
欧盟的委员会与委托制度
这篇文章论述了欧洲联盟的滑稽行为和代表团制度。它探讨了诸如滑稽学的演变、在制定实施和授权法案的过程中对欧盟委员会的当代控制程序、立法者对控制程序的偏好、决定这些程序最终选择的因素等问题。文章表明,该系统是基于“警察巡逻”模式。我们是否应该将滑稽/授权程序视为一种控制或讨论(审议)机制?这个问题具有最大的理论意义。本文的目的是基于现有的实证研究,展示欧盟机构在选择滑稽/委派程序时的实际偏好以及影响最终决定的因素。文章表明,在《里斯本条约》之前和之后,各机构在选择程序方面的偏好有很大差异,这在很大程度上可以用最大限度地扩大其自身影响力的目标来解释。对程序最终选择结果的实证分析表明,推动更严格控制程序的主要因素是制度冲突和所讨论问题的复杂性。这些程序选择的偏好和因素可以得出这样的结论:欧盟机构认为滑稽和授权制度主要是委托代理理论逻辑中对委员会的控制机制。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
40.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: “Contemporary Europe” – is academic journal founded in 2000 by Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences. 4 The journal published quarterly since 2000 under auspices of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Editorial board and editorial staff consider themselves as a mirror of contemporary Russian political, economical and social sciences in general, we eager to reflect in the journal’s pages current level of Russian-European relations, European Studies in Russia and European Union. “Contemporary Europe” focused on the problems of relations and cooperation between Russia and European Union, economical, political, cultural, religious situation in Russia and European countries. “Contemporary Europe” have managed to occupy a leading place in the community of experts on European Studies. Among our authors and members of Editorial Board – scholars, famous political scientists, experts in Foreign affairs. Our journal distributing throughout government institutions, embassies, research centers, libraries in Russia and abroad. The journal has nowadays more than 1000 thousand regular subscribers. The data on our readership convincingly show that the journal is actively and frequently used as a kind of text book by university students. Thus, visitors to public libraries might often come across outworn copies of the journal – evidence of its frequent (and regrettably rather rough) use by the readers. Book reviews occupy a significant part “Contemporary Europe” to presenting to our readers most of the publications of interest appearing in Russia and European Union.
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