Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts

IF 6.8 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Joel Watson
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This article describes the emerging game-theoretic framework for modeling long-term contractual relationships with moral hazard. The framework combines self-enforcement and external enforcement, accommodating alternative assumptions regarding how actively the parties initially set and renegotiate the terms of their contract. A progression of theoretical components is reviewed, building from the recursive formulation of equilibrium continuation values in repeated games. A principal-agent setting serves as a running example.
关系激励合同的理论基础
本文描述了新兴的博弈论框架,用于建模具有道德风险的长期合同关系。该框架结合了自我执行和外部执行,提供了关于各方最初如何积极制定和重新谈判合同条款的替代假设。从重复博弈中均衡连续值的递归公式出发,回顾了理论组成部分的进展。委托代理环境是一个运行的例子。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.70
自引率
3.60%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: The Annual Review of Economics covers significant developments in the field of economics, including macroeconomics and money; microeconomics, including economic psychology; international economics; public finance; health economics; education; economic growth and technological change; economic development; social economics, including culture, institutions, social interaction, and networks; game theory, political economy, and social choice; and more.
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