Enforcement Credibility and Frequency of Negotiations in Civil Wars

IF 0.1 Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Hojung Joo and Taehee Whang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This article explores the effect of enforcement credibility on the number of negotiations during civil war peace processes. While the use of negotiations during civil wars has increased since the Cold War, there has been a lack of attention to the obstacles faced by conflict parties once negotiations begin. We argue that conflict resolution should be evaluated as a stepwise process, in which factors that increase prospects for agreement enforcement may impact the onset or frequency of negotiations differently. We rely on the international cooperation literature which addresses the relationship between bargaining and enforcement problems. As enforcement becomes more credible, parties engage in bargaining more rigorously in order to make sure the distributive terms are satisfactory. We argue that while the presence of third-party medi- ators and a negotiating partner with a strong internal support base might increase the likelihood of agreement enforcement, they may also make conflict parties more careful when drafting the agreement, since the cost of revising or breaking the agreement also rises with enforcement credibility. We test the effect of third parties and internal support on the number of negotiations using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model. We find that the presence of mediators and the presence of a rebel group with a strong support base increase the frequency of negotiations. We also find that factors such as rebel territorial control and Cold War have distinct effects on negotiation onset and not on negotiation frequency, emphasizing the importance of evaluating con-The flict resolution as a multilevel process.
内战中的执法可信度与谈判频率
本文探讨了执法可信度对内战和平进程中谈判次数的影响。尽管自冷战以来,内战期间谈判的使用有所增加,但一旦谈判开始,冲突各方所面临的障碍却缺乏关注。我们认为,应将解决冲突视为一个循序渐进的过程,在这个过程中,增加协议执行前景的因素可能会对谈判的开始或频率产生不同的影响。我们依赖国际合作文献,这些文献涉及谈判和执法问题之间的关系。随着执行变得更加可信,各方更严格地进行谈判,以确保分配条款令人满意。我们认为,尽管第三方中介机构和拥有强大内部支持基础的谈判伙伴的存在可能会增加协议执行的可能性,但它们也可能使冲突各方在起草协议时更加谨慎,因为修改或破坏协议的成本也会随着执行可信度的提高而增加。我们使用零膨胀负二项回归模型测试了第三方和内部支持对谈判次数的影响。我们发现,调解人的存在和拥有强大支持基础的反叛团体的存在增加了谈判的频率。我们还发现,叛军的领土控制和冷战等因素对谈判开始有明显的影响,而对谈判频率没有明显的影响。这强调了评估冲突解决作为一个多层次过程的重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Korean Journal of International Studies
Korean Journal of International Studies INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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