Strategic choices by the incumbent and challenger during revolution and civil war

IF 1.1 Q3 ECONOMICS
K. Hausken, Mthuli Ncube
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

A game is developed where an incumbent chooses between benefits provision to the population, which decreases the probability of revolution endogenously, and fighting with a challenger. Thereafter the challenger chooses a degree of fighting, which determines rent sharing. A successful revolution enables the challenger to replace the incumbent. An unsuccessful revolution preserves the status quo, or causes standoff or coalition. The four possibilities of incumbent replacement, status quo, standoff, or coalition combine with the incumbent either repressing (providing benefits below a threshold) or accommodating (providing benefits above a threshold) the population, for a total of eight outcomes. Such a rich conceptualization of eight outcomes of civil war is missing in the literature. We show how an advantaged versus disadvantaged incumbent deters or fights with a challenger, and provides versus does not provide benefits to the population. The eight outcomes are mapped to 87 revolutions 1961-2011.
革命和内战期间在位者和挑战者的战略选择
在这个游戏中,在位者在向民众提供利益(这会减少革命的可能性)和与挑战者战斗之间做出选择。之后,挑战者选择战斗的程度,这决定了租金的分配。一场成功的革命能使挑战者取代在位者。一场不成功的革命要么维持现状,要么导致僵局或联盟。在职者替代、维持现状、对峙或联合的四种可能性与在职者抑制(提供低于阈值的福利)或容纳(提供高于阈值的福利)人口相结合,总共有八种结果。如此丰富的内战八种结果的概念化在文献中是缺失的。我们展示了优势在位者与劣势在位者如何威慑或对抗挑战者,以及如何为民众提供利益与不提供利益。这八项结果被映射到1961年至2011年的87次革命。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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CiteScore
1.00
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7
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