Distributive Justice in Collaborative Outputs: Empowering Minority Viewpoints through Deliberation

Abstract

This article explores how deliberation affects distributive justice for minority view participants in policy decisions made through collaborative governance. It also examines whether the quality of deliberation (i.e., willingness to accept opposing viewpoints) and quantity of deliberation (i.e., length of discussion) can be an effective tool for minority view participants to overcome power imbalances in such collective decision-making processes. I use Agent-Based Modeling (ABM), a computer simulation experiment method, to examine interactions among participants in a collaborative governance arrangement. I develop a series of theoretical propositions based on the simulation results, which are robust to various changes in the parameters and assumptions of the model. First, both the quality and quantity of deliberation may enhance the decision acceptability of participants with minority views. Second, the quality of deliberation may be more effective at empowering underrepresented minority view participants than the quantity of deliberation. Third, the quantity of deliberation may better promote minority views than the quality of deliberation when minority view participants are overrepresented. These findings indicate that interpersonal justice in collaborative processes may enhance distributive justice for minority viewpoints in collaborative outputs, even when procedural justice in the design of collaboration is weakened by an underrepresentation of minority view participants. I conclude with suggestions for future research that can further improve the external validity of the theoretical propositions.