Why Did the Consolidated Tax Regime Cause Massive Losses in Tax Revenue in Russia?

IF 1 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
N. S. Kostrykina, A. Korytin
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

In Russia, the consolidated tax regime was introduced in 2012 but in 2019 the decision was made to abolish it from 2023. The initial reform purported to discourage companies from using transfer pricing for domestic transactions between companies of one group and to ensure a more just allocation of the corporate income tax across Russian regions. In practice, however, the government’s shortfall in tax revenue reached two billion US dollars in certain years or 0.15% of Russia’s GDP. Our analysis has shown that the publicly available data are, unfortunately, insufficient for assessing the success of this reform, in particular, whether the two above-mentioned goals were achieved. However, we can focus on the role the following two factors played in the budgetary losses. The first such factor is that profits and losses of group members can be consolidated within one accounting (fiscal) period. The second factor is that consolidated taxpayer groups shift their tax bases to regions with lower tax rates (in some cases, regions established tax preferences explicitly for the purpose of attracting members of these groups). These loopholes reveal the deficiencies of the Russian consolidation model: for example, the ‘everybody or nobody’ principle is not applied in Russia and consolidated taxpayer groups are allowed to form the perimeter of tax consolidation themselves. In this paper, statistical tax reporting data are used to estimate the total amount of the shortfall in tax revenue caused by the regional tax preferences granted to members of consolidated taxpayer groups. In some cases, as our analysis of regional tax legislation shows, these tax preferences were intended to ‘steal’ the tax base from other regions or at least to prevent the regions’ own tax bases from being ‘stolen’ by rivals. Judging by the total figures, regional tax competition had a negative influence on budgetary revenues. This, however, was not the main factor as the shortfall in revenue was mostly caused by the possibility of immediate offset of losses within consolidated taxpayer groups. For citation Kostrykina N.S., Korytin A.V. Why Did the Consolidated Tax Regime Cause Massive Losses in Tax Revenue in Russia? Journal of Tax Reform . 2020;6(1):6–21. DOI: 10.15826/jtr.2020.6.1.072. Article info Received January 31, 2020 ; Revised March 1, 2020 ; Accepted April 10, 2020
俄罗斯统一税制为何造成巨额税收损失?
俄罗斯在2012年引入了统一税制,但在2019年决定从2023年开始废除。最初的改革旨在阻止企业在一个集团的公司之间的国内交易中使用转移定价,并确保企业所得税在俄罗斯各地区之间更公平地分配。但在实践中,政府的税收缺口在某些年份达到20亿美元,占俄罗斯GDP的0.15%。我们的分析表明,不幸的是,公开可用的数据不足以评估这一改革的成功,特别是上述两个目标是否实现。但是,我们可以重点关注以下两个因素在预算损失中所起的作用。第一个因素是集团成员的利润和亏损可以在一个会计(财政)期间合并。第二个因素是合并的纳税人集团将其税基转移到税率较低的地区(在某些情况下,地区为了吸引这些集团的成员而明确建立税收优惠)。这些漏洞揭示了俄罗斯整合模式的缺陷:例如,“要么人人参与,要么无人参与”的原则在俄罗斯不适用,合并后的纳税人集团被允许自己形成税收整合的边界。本文采用统计纳税申报数据,对合并纳税人集团成员享受区域税收优惠造成的税收缺口总量进行估算。在某些情况下,正如我们对地区税收立法的分析所显示的那样,这些税收优惠旨在从其他地区“窃取”税基,或者至少防止该地区自己的税基被竞争对手“窃取”。从总量来看,地区税收竞争对预算收入产生了负面影响。然而,这并不是主要因素,因为收入减少的主要原因是合并纳税人集团内部的损失可能会立即被抵消。Kostrykina n.s., Korytin A.V.。为什么合并税制在俄罗斯造成了巨大的税收损失?税收改革杂志。2020; 6(1): 6-21。DOI: 10.15826 / jtr.2020.6.1.072。收稿日期:2020年1月31日;2020年3月1日修订;接受2020年4月10日
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来源期刊
Journal of Tax Reform
Journal of Tax Reform BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
50.00%
发文量
13
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