NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements Revisited in Light of the NPT and the TPNW

IF 1.1 Q2 LAW
Mika Hayashi
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

The nuclear sharing arrangements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are arrangements that pre-date the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This article revisits the nuclear sharing arrangements in light of the NPT, then examines the issues in light of a new treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The question of the compatibility between these arrangements and the NPT was initially solved by an understanding that the stationing of the US nuclear weapons in host States did not involve transfer of ownership or transfer of control of these weapons to host States. Compared to the initial acceptance of this interpretation, the contemporary acceptance is less solid. The nuclear sharing arrangements are questioned or criticised in the NPT Review process, both by non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States. In contrast, with regard to the TPNW, there seems to be no controversy; the TPNW explicitly provides that the States Parties must not allow stationing of nuclear weapons. The nuclear sharing arrangements would be incompatible with this prohibition. The article also briefly deals with a separate question, whether a client State of extended nuclear deterrence that does not allow stationing of nuclear weapons in its territory would also contravene the prohibitions in the TPNW. Given the scope and the nature of provisions of the TPNW, the article concludes that it would, if such a client State joins the treaty without a change in its policy regarding extended deterrence.
根据《不扩散条约》和《全面禁止核武器条约》修改北约的核共享安排
北大西洋公约组织(北约)的核共享安排是早于《核不扩散条约》(不扩散条约)的安排。本文根据《不扩散条约》重新审视了核共享安排,然后根据新条约《禁止核武器条约》审查了这些问题。这些安排与《不扩散条约》之间的兼容性问题最初是通过一项谅解得到解决的,即美国在东道国部署核武器并不涉及将这些武器的所有权或控制权转让给东道国。与最初对这一解释的接受相比,当代人的接受程度较低。核共享安排在《不扩散条约》审议进程中受到无核武器国家和核武器国家的质疑或批评。相比之下,关于TPNW,似乎没有争议;TPNW明确规定,缔约国不得允许部署核武器。核共享安排将不符合这一禁令。该条还简要讨论了另一个问题,即不允许在其领土上部署核武器的扩大核威慑的客户国是否也会违反《禁止核武器条约》的禁令。鉴于《全面禁止核武器条约》条款的范围和性质,该条的结论是,如果这样一个客户国在不改变其扩大威慑政策的情况下加入该条约,它就会加入。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
25.00%
发文量
33
期刊介绍: The Journal of Conflict & Security Law is a thrice yearly refereed journal aimed at academics, government officials, military lawyers and lawyers working in the area, as well as individuals interested in the areas of arms control law, the law of armed conflict (international humanitarian law) and collective security law. The Journal covers the whole spectrum of international law relating to armed conflict from the pre-conflict stage when the issues include those of arms control, disarmament, and conflict prevention and discussions of the legality of the resort to force, through to the outbreak of armed conflict when attention turns to the coverage of the conduct of military operations and the protection of non-combatants by international humanitarian law.
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