Proportionality, Abstract Causation, and the Exclusion Problem

IF 0.7 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
A. Aliyev
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACT A considerable number of philosophers are attracted to what might be called ‘causal type-abstractionism’ – the view that photographs, symphonies, models of cars, novels, flags, and other multiply instantiable entities that are, or at least seem to be, artifacts are a particular kind of abstracta, namely causally efficacious types. Despite its popularity, however, causal type-abstractionism faces a problem: Given some plausible assumptions, it commits us to a seemingly unpalatable consequence – that there is widespread type-causal overdetermination, or, in other words, a multitude of situations where one and the same effect has two or more distinct independently sufficient causes, at least one of which involves type causation. Recently, a powerful solution to this problem has been offered by Tim Juvshik. Drawing upon the literature on mental causation, he argues that the foregoing consequence could be avoided without abandoning causal type-abstractionism – if we adopt a particular treatment of causes based on Stephen Yablo’s principle of proportionality. My primary goal in this essay is to show that the given solution fails. Additionally, I aim to sketch a solution that, I think, provides a promising type-abstractionist way to resolve the problem being discussed.
比例性、抽象因果关系和排除问题
相当多的哲学家被所谓的“因果类型抽象主义”所吸引——这种观点认为,照片、交响乐、汽车模型、小说、旗帜和其他多重可实例化的实体,或者至少看起来是人工制品,是一种特殊的抽象,即因果有效的类型。然而,尽管它很受欢迎,但因果类型抽象主义面临着一个问题:给定一些貌似合理的假设,它会让我们面临一个看似令人不快的结果——存在广泛的类型因果过度决定,或者,换句话说,在许多情况下,同一个结果有两个或更多不同的独立充分原因,其中至少有一个涉及类型因果关系。最近,Tim Juvshik为这个问题提供了一个强有力的解决方案。根据关于心理因果关系的文献,他认为,如果我们采用基于斯蒂芬·亚布罗的比例原则的特殊原因处理方法,那么在不放弃因果类型抽象主义的情况下,可以避免上述结果。我在这篇文章中的主要目标是表明给定的解决方案是失败的。此外,我的目标是概述一个解决方案,我认为它提供了一种有前途的类型抽象方法来解决正在讨论的问题。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
29
期刊介绍: The International Journal of Philosophical Studies (IJPS) publishes academic articles of the highest quality from both analytic and continental traditions and provides a forum for publishing on a broader range of issues than is currently available in philosophical journals. IJPS also publishes annual special issues devoted to key thematic areas or to critical engagements with contemporary philosophers of note. Through its Discussion section, it provides a lively forum for exchange of ideas and encourages dialogue and mutual comprehension across all philosophical traditions. The journal also contains an extensive book review section, including occasional book symposia. It also provides Critical Notices which review major books or themes in depth.
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