How intelligent neurotechnology can be epistemically unjust. An exploration into the ethics of algorithms

Abstract

Recently, the epistemic quality of algorithms and its normative implications have come under scrutiny. While general questions of justice have been addressed in this context, specific issues of epistemic (in)justice have so far been neglected. We aim to fill this gap by analyzing some potential implications of behavioral intelligent neurotechnology (B-INT). We claim that B-INT exhibits a number of epistemic features implying the potential for certain epistemic problems, which, in turn, are likely to result in instances of epistemic injustice. To support this claim, we will first introduce and specify the terminology and technology behind B-INT. Second, we will present four fictitious scenarios of using B-INT and highlight a number of epistemic issues that might arise. Third, we will discuss their relation to the concept of epistemic justice, as well as potential instances thereof. Thus, we will show some important and morally relevant implications of the epistemic properties of INT.