{"title":"Evolving ESG Reporting Governance, Regime Theory, and Proactive Law: Predictions and Strategies","authors":"Adam Sulkowski, Ruth Jebe","doi":"10.1111/ablj.12210","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Transparency on ESG (environmental, social, and governance) is an important, if imperfect, step in striving for sustainability. Because a constellation of nonprofit organizations created voluntary reporting frameworks with little government involvement, ESG reporting governance is institutionally dense and fragmented. Reporting companies and information users have both expressed dissatisfaction. In 2020, standard-setting organizations indicated their intent to cooperate to simplify ESG reporting rules. In a different yet similar context, scholars utilize regime theory to understand institutional density and the potential for international cooperation, primarily among states. This article is the first to apply regime theory to ESG reporting governance architecture to better understand this unusual arena of rulemaking. It identifies key obstacles to global consolidation of ESG reporting governance and predicts that differences between the reporting philosophies in the European Union and the United States are among the factors that will prevent global consolidation of ESG reporting governance. This article concludes with advice for practitioners. It draws on law and strategy and proactive law literature to propose approaches for reporting companies navigating the complex landscape of ESG reporting governance.</p>","PeriodicalId":54186,"journal":{"name":"American Business Law Journal","volume":"59 3","pages":"449-503"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Business Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ablj.12210","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
Transparency on ESG (environmental, social, and governance) is an important, if imperfect, step in striving for sustainability. Because a constellation of nonprofit organizations created voluntary reporting frameworks with little government involvement, ESG reporting governance is institutionally dense and fragmented. Reporting companies and information users have both expressed dissatisfaction. In 2020, standard-setting organizations indicated their intent to cooperate to simplify ESG reporting rules. In a different yet similar context, scholars utilize regime theory to understand institutional density and the potential for international cooperation, primarily among states. This article is the first to apply regime theory to ESG reporting governance architecture to better understand this unusual arena of rulemaking. It identifies key obstacles to global consolidation of ESG reporting governance and predicts that differences between the reporting philosophies in the European Union and the United States are among the factors that will prevent global consolidation of ESG reporting governance. This article concludes with advice for practitioners. It draws on law and strategy and proactive law literature to propose approaches for reporting companies navigating the complex landscape of ESG reporting governance.
期刊介绍:
The ABLJ is a faculty-edited, double blind peer reviewed journal, continuously published since 1963. Our mission is to publish only top quality law review articles that make a scholarly contribution to all areas of law that impact business theory and practice. We search for those articles that articulate a novel research question and make a meaningful contribution directly relevant to scholars and practitioners of business law. The blind peer review process means legal scholars well-versed in the relevant specialty area have determined selected articles are original, thorough, important, and timely. Faculty editors assure the authors’ contribution to scholarship is evident. We aim to elevate legal scholarship and inform responsible business decisions.