Evolving ESG Reporting Governance, Regime Theory, and Proactive Law: Predictions and Strategies

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 BUSINESS
Adam Sulkowski, Ruth Jebe
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Transparency on ESG (environmental, social, and governance) is an important, if imperfect, step in striving for sustainability. Because a constellation of nonprofit organizations created voluntary reporting frameworks with little government involvement, ESG reporting governance is institutionally dense and fragmented. Reporting companies and information users have both expressed dissatisfaction. In 2020, standard-setting organizations indicated their intent to cooperate to simplify ESG reporting rules. In a different yet similar context, scholars utilize regime theory to understand institutional density and the potential for international cooperation, primarily among states. This article is the first to apply regime theory to ESG reporting governance architecture to better understand this unusual arena of rulemaking. It identifies key obstacles to global consolidation of ESG reporting governance and predicts that differences between the reporting philosophies in the European Union and the United States are among the factors that will prevent global consolidation of ESG reporting governance. This article concludes with advice for practitioners. It draws on law and strategy and proactive law literature to propose approaches for reporting companies navigating the complex landscape of ESG reporting governance.

演进中的ESG报告治理、制度理论与前瞻性法律:预测与策略
ESG(环境、社会和治理)的透明度是实现可持续发展的重要一步,尽管这一步并不完美。由于一群非营利组织在政府极少参与的情况下创建了自愿报告框架,ESG报告治理在制度上密集而分散。报告公司和信息使用者都表达了不满。2020年,标准制定组织表示有意合作简化ESG报告规则。在一个不同但相似的背景下,学者们利用制度理论来理解制度密度和国际合作的潜力,主要是国家之间的合作。本文首次将制度理论应用于ESG报告治理架构,以更好地理解这个不同寻常的规则制定领域。报告指出了全球整合ESG报告治理的主要障碍,并预测欧盟和美国报告理念的差异是阻碍全球整合ESG报告治理的因素之一。本文最后给出了对从业者的建议。它借鉴了法律和战略以及前瞻性法律文献,为报告公司在复杂的ESG报告治理环境中导航提出了方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
16.70%
发文量
17
期刊介绍: The ABLJ is a faculty-edited, double blind peer reviewed journal, continuously published since 1963. Our mission is to publish only top quality law review articles that make a scholarly contribution to all areas of law that impact business theory and practice. We search for those articles that articulate a novel research question and make a meaningful contribution directly relevant to scholars and practitioners of business law. The blind peer review process means legal scholars well-versed in the relevant specialty area have determined selected articles are original, thorough, important, and timely. Faculty editors assure the authors’ contribution to scholarship is evident. We aim to elevate legal scholarship and inform responsible business decisions.
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