Ontological (in)Security and the Iran Nuclear Deal—Explaining Instability in US Foreign Policy Interests

Abstract

On July 14, 2015, under the leadership of the Obama administration, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal—was signed. After 35 years of diplomatic isolation, the agreement marked a watershed moment in the United States–Iran relations and achieved a key US national security objective regarding nuclear non-proliferation. However, the agreement faced significant domestic opposition grounded in concerns that Iran was untrustworthy. Yet, the prospect of withdrawal generated a sense of insecurity that the United States’s status as a “responsible world leader” would be undermined, despite ongoing anxieties around Iran’s compliance. What explains such a paradox in foreign policy preferences? By incorporating discursive institutionalist approaches with ontological security perspectives, I work to show how President Obama’s entry into the agreement generated ontological insecurities as he struggled to displace existing narratives around Iran as a hostile, untrustworthy actor. Yet, Iran’s compliance with the agreement made it equally difficult for Trump to justify withdrawal; instead, his efforts raised additional concerns that America’s international standing would be undermined. Theoretically, this paper incorporates discursive institutionalist insights with ontological security to disaggregate how different conceptions of the “Self” are contested and activated in policy debates in ways that lead to instability and variation in US foreign policy.