{"title":"Public or Private Venture Capital","authors":"Darian M. Ibrahim","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3266756","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The United States has an unparalled entrepreneurial ecosystem. Silicon Valley startups commercialize cutting-edge science, create plentiful jobs, and spur economic growth. Without angel investors and venture capital funds (VCs) willing to gamble on these high-risk, high-tech companies, none of this would be possible. \n \nFrom a law-and-economics perspective, startup investing is incredibly risky. Information asymmetry and agency costs abound. In the U.S., angels and VCs successfully mitigate these problems through private ordering and informal means. Countries without our robust private venture capital system have attempted to fund startups publicly by creating junior stock exchanges. These exchanges have been largely failures, however, in part because they have unsuccessfully relied on mandatory disclosure and other tools better suited to mitigating investment risks in established public companies. \n \nThe U.S.’s relative success in supplying private venture capital makes our recent infatuation with crowdfunding curious. Fortunately, while crowdfunding was originally designed to resemble public venture capital, with “funding portals” acting as the junior stock exchanges, its final implementing rules took important steps back toward the private venture capital model.","PeriodicalId":46514,"journal":{"name":"Washington Law Review","volume":"94 1","pages":"1137"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2018-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Washington Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3266756","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
The United States has an unparalled entrepreneurial ecosystem. Silicon Valley startups commercialize cutting-edge science, create plentiful jobs, and spur economic growth. Without angel investors and venture capital funds (VCs) willing to gamble on these high-risk, high-tech companies, none of this would be possible.
From a law-and-economics perspective, startup investing is incredibly risky. Information asymmetry and agency costs abound. In the U.S., angels and VCs successfully mitigate these problems through private ordering and informal means. Countries without our robust private venture capital system have attempted to fund startups publicly by creating junior stock exchanges. These exchanges have been largely failures, however, in part because they have unsuccessfully relied on mandatory disclosure and other tools better suited to mitigating investment risks in established public companies.
The U.S.’s relative success in supplying private venture capital makes our recent infatuation with crowdfunding curious. Fortunately, while crowdfunding was originally designed to resemble public venture capital, with “funding portals” acting as the junior stock exchanges, its final implementing rules took important steps back toward the private venture capital model.
期刊介绍:
Washington Law Review is a student-run and student-edited scholarly legal journal at the University of Washington School of Law. Inaugurated in 1919, it is the first legal journal published in the Pacific Northwest. Today, the Law Review publishes Articles and Comments of national and regional interest four times per year.