Relational autonomy: where Confucius and Mencius stand on freedom

Abstract

ABSTRACT I approach the person in the context of ren (being-humane) and li (ritual propriety) in dialogue with role ethics and the issue of autonomy. The hypotheses are as follows: first, even if the person is committed to dao, the person is to enjoy uncoerced freedom of choice, or at least some measure of it in the case of early Confucianism; second, the sentimental and rational dimensions are unified and make up a judgment as a whole in the Chinese context, whereas the functioning of reason is more elevated in the West; third, ren and li are mutually constitutive, requiring and complementing one another as internal awareness and external practice respectively. Even though ren and li both share an orientation to social order, they differ with respect to internalized recognition and simply following norms. If relationships are constitutive of persons and the focus of relational autonomy is on cultivation, then there is no conflict between self-completion and autonomy.