Strategic Information Suppression in Borrowing and Pre-Lending Cognition: Theory and Evidence

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS
Games Pub Date : 2023-05-24 DOI:10.3390/g14030043
Zhongwen Chen, Xiaojian Zhao
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper theoretically studies the interaction between an informed borrower and an uninformed lender facing possible default of a loan application. The lender is motivated to invest cognitive resources before making a lending decision. If the regulatory fine is weak, it is impossible for a bad-debt borrower to fully disclose his situation in the application. In this case, when the likelihood of a bad debt is low, the borrower always claims that nothing in the application is wrong. Otherwise, the borrower randomizes between full disclosure and information suppression. The transaction cost of the lender’s pre-lending cognition increases with the default probability, as the default probability is small and decreases thereafter. Evidence from a peer-to-peer lending platform with 816,274 observations between 2012 and 2015 in the United States is largely consistent with our model implications.
借贷前认知中的战略信息抑制:理论与证据
本文从理论上研究了面临贷款申请可能违约的知情借款人和不知情贷款人之间的互动关系。贷款人有动机在做出贷款决定之前投资认知资源。如果监管罚款力度较弱,坏账借款人就不可能在申请中充分披露自己的情况。在这种情况下,当坏账的可能性很低时,借款人总是声称申请中没有任何错误。否则,借款人会在充分披露和信息压制之间随机化。贷款人贷前认知的交易成本随着违约概率的增加而增加,因为违约概率较小,此后交易成本降低。来自一个对等借贷平台的证据在2012年至2015年间在美国进行了816274次观察,这在很大程度上与我们的模型含义一致。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Games
Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
11.10%
发文量
65
审稿时长
11 weeks
期刊介绍: Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.
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