Why Do Farmers Seek Office? Regulatory Capture in Russian Agricultural Subsidization

IF 1.3 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Eastern European Economics Pub Date : 2022-11-30 DOI:10.1080/00128775.2022.2149556

V. Kvartiuk, Thomas Herzfeld

引用次数: 1

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study examines whether Russian farmers who enter regional politics can skew local policies in their favor. We hypothesize that Russian regions with more local members of parliament (MPs) owning agricultural businesses and farmer-ministers are more likely to allocate higher agricultural subsidies. To test these hypotheses, we use a unique 2008–2015 panel dataset on agricultural subsidies in combination with qualitative data. We find that the pervasiveness of agricultural interest in local parliaments affects the size of agricultural subsidies. Regional agriculture ministers who own farms may play the role of “gatekeepers” to the subsidies.

查看原文本刊更多论文

农民为什么找办公室？俄罗斯农业补贴中的监管捕获

摘要本研究考察了进入地区政治的俄罗斯农民是否会扭曲有利于他们的地方政策。我们假设，拥有更多农业企业的地方议员和农民部长的俄罗斯地区更有可能分配更高的农业补贴。为了检验这些假设，我们使用了一个独特的2008-2015年农业补贴面板数据集，并结合定性数据。我们发现，地方议会中农业利益的普遍性影响了农业补贴的规模。拥有农场的地区农业部长可能扮演补贴的“看门人”角色。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Eastern European Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.20

自引率

9.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： Eastern European Economics publishes original research on the newly emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe, with coverage of the ongoing processes of transition to market economics in different countries, their integration into the broader European and global economies, and the ramifications of the 2008-9 financial crisis. An introduction by the journal"s editor adds context and expert insights on the articles presented in each issue.