Deciding: how special is it?

Abstract

ABSTRACT To decide to A, as I conceive of it, is to perform a momentary mental action of forming an intention to A. I argue that ordinary instances of practical deciding, so conceived, falsify the following two theses: (1) Necessarily, S intentionally A-s only if S intends to A; (2) In every actual case of intentionally A-ing, the agent intends to A. But I also argue that actions of some other types falsify these theses. Practical deciding is not unique in this respect. In another respect, however, it may be unique. It may be the only source of counterexamples to the thesis that, in any actual case of intentional action, some relevant intention is at work. In addition, actual instances of deciding to A may differ from other actual basic actions in that whereas the latter are successful attempts to A, actual agents never try to decide to A (as opposed to trying to decide what to do and to trying to bring it about that they decide to A).