Advising the Management: A Theory of Shareholder Engagement

IF 6.8 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Review of Financial Studies Pub Date : 2022-08-26 DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhac061

A. Kakhbod, Uliana Loginova, A. Malenko, Nadya Malenko

引用次数: 3

Abstract

We study the effectiveness of shareholder engagement, that is, shareholders communicating their views to management. When shareholders and management have different beliefs, each shareholder engages more effectively when other shareholders engage as well. A limited shareholder base can thus prevent effective engagement. However, a limited shareholder base naturally arises under heterogeneous beliefs because investors who most disagree with management do not become shareholders. Passive funds, which own the firm regardless of their beliefs, can counteract these effects and improve engagement. When shareholders’ and management’s preferences are strongly misaligned, shareholders’ engagement decisions become substitutes and the role of ownership structure declines.

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建议管理层:股东参与理论

我们研究股东参与的有效性，即股东向管理层传达他们的观点。当股东和管理层有不同的信念时，当其他股东也参与进来时，每个股东都会更有效地参与进来。因此，有限的股东基础可能会阻碍有效参与。然而，有限的股东基础自然会在异质的信念下产生，因为最不同意管理层意见的投资者不会成为股东。被动基金拥有公司，无论其信仰如何，都可以抵消这些影响并提高参与度。当股东和管理层的偏好严重错位时，股东的参与决策就会成为替代品，所有权结构的作用就会下降。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Review of Financial Studies Multiple-

CiteScore

16.00

自引率

2.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Financial Studies is a prominent platform that aims to foster and widely distribute noteworthy research in financial economics. With an expansive editorial board, the Review strives to maintain a balance between theoretical and empirical contributions. The primary focus of paper selection is based on the quality and significance of the research to the field of finance, rather than its level of technical complexity. The scope of finance within the Review encompasses its intersection with economics. Sponsoring The Society for Financial Studies, the Review and the Society appoint editors and officers through limited terms.