{"title":"Non-compliance behavior of de-risking force the EU to enhance anti-money laundering regulation","authors":"K. Rose","doi":"10.1108/JFRC-12-2020-0113","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nPurpose\nRecent research shows that because of money-laundering risks, there has been an increase in the off-boarding of certain types of corporate clients in the financial sector. This phenomenon known as “de-risking” has been argued to have a negative impact on society, because it increases the possible risk of money laundering. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the de-risking strategy of financial institutions results in an expansion of the regulatory framework concerning anti-money laundering focusing on off-boarding of clients and, if so, is there a way to avoid further regulation by changing present behavior.\n\n\nDesign/methodology/approach\nThis paper applies functional methods to law and economics to achieve higher efficiency in combating money laundering.\n\n\nFindings\nIn this paper, it is found that the continuing of de-risking by financial institutions because of the avoidance strategy of money-laundering risks will inevitably result in further regulatory demands regarding the off-boarding process of clients. The legal basis for the introduction of further regulatory intervention is that some of the de-risking constitutes a direct contradiction to the aim of the present regulatory framework, making the behavior non-compliant to the regulation.\n\n\nOriginality/value\nThere has been very little research concerning de-risking related to money laundering. The present research has focused on the effect on society and not the relationship between the financial institutions and the regulator. This paper raises an important and present problem, as the behavior of the financial institutions constitute a response from the regulator that is contradicting the thoughts behind the behavior of the financial institutions. It is found that the paper is highly relevant if an expansion of regulation is to be hindered.\n","PeriodicalId":44814,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/JFRC-12-2020-0113","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Purpose
Recent research shows that because of money-laundering risks, there has been an increase in the off-boarding of certain types of corporate clients in the financial sector. This phenomenon known as “de-risking” has been argued to have a negative impact on society, because it increases the possible risk of money laundering. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the de-risking strategy of financial institutions results in an expansion of the regulatory framework concerning anti-money laundering focusing on off-boarding of clients and, if so, is there a way to avoid further regulation by changing present behavior.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper applies functional methods to law and economics to achieve higher efficiency in combating money laundering.
Findings
In this paper, it is found that the continuing of de-risking by financial institutions because of the avoidance strategy of money-laundering risks will inevitably result in further regulatory demands regarding the off-boarding process of clients. The legal basis for the introduction of further regulatory intervention is that some of the de-risking constitutes a direct contradiction to the aim of the present regulatory framework, making the behavior non-compliant to the regulation.
Originality/value
There has been very little research concerning de-risking related to money laundering. The present research has focused on the effect on society and not the relationship between the financial institutions and the regulator. This paper raises an important and present problem, as the behavior of the financial institutions constitute a response from the regulator that is contradicting the thoughts behind the behavior of the financial institutions. It is found that the paper is highly relevant if an expansion of regulation is to be hindered.
期刊介绍:
Since its inception in 1992, the Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance has provided an authoritative and scholarly platform for international research in financial regulation and compliance. The journal is at the intersection between academic research and the practice of financial regulation, with distinguished past authors including senior regulators, central bankers and even a Prime Minister. Financial crises, predatory practices, internationalization and integration, the increased use of technology and financial innovation are just some of the changes and issues that contemporary financial regulators are grappling with. These challenges and changes hold profound implications for regulation and compliance, ranging from macro-prudential to consumer protection policies. The journal seeks to illuminate these issues, is pluralistic in approach and invites scholarly papers using any appropriate methodology. Accordingly, the journal welcomes submissions from finance, law, economics and interdisciplinary perspectives. A broad spectrum of research styles, sources of information and topics (e.g. banking laws and regulations, stock market and cross border regulation, risk assessment and management, training and competence, competition law, case law, compliance and regulatory updates and guidelines) are appropriate. All submissions are double-blind refereed and judged on academic rigour, originality, quality of exposition and relevance to policy and practice. Once accepted, individual articles are typeset, proofed and published online as the Version of Record within an average of 32 days, so that articles can be downloaded and cited earlier.