Hyman on intentional explanations and the problem of deviant causal chains

Abstract

ABSTRACT Intentional explanations are explanations of actions that specify the motive for which the action was done. A central question is whether causality plays a role in such explanations. Causalists insist that it does. One of the most pressing problems for Causalism is often taken to be the possibility that what an agent does is caused by her motive despite the agent not acting intentionally. This is known as the problem of deviant causal chains. Recently, Causalism has received a new defence by Hyman, which includes a treatment of the problem of deviant causal chains. This paper assesses Hyman’s account by focusing on its commitments. First, to get a clear view of the relation between Causalism and the problem of deviant causal chains it distinguishes the question whether intentional explanations are causal explanations from the question whether they admit of an analysis in causal terms. Secondly, it is argued that Hyman, against his inclination, is committed to the existence of such an analysis. Thirdly, synthesising insights from Hyman and Davidson, an analysis of intentional explanations in dispositional terms is proposed and defended against putative counterexamples.