Incentive Mechanisms for Fairness Among Strategic Agents

IF 13.8 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC
Abhinav Sinha, A. Anastasopoulos
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引用次数: 12

Abstract

Mechanism design for incentivizing strategic agents to maximize their sum of utilities (SoU) is a well-studied problem in the context of resource allocation in networks. There are, however, a number of network resource allocation problems of interest where a designer may have a different objective than maximization of the SoU. The obvious reason for seeking a different objective is that this notion of efficiency does not account for fairness of allocation. A second, more subtle, reason for demanding fairer allocation is that it indirectly implies less variation in taxes paid by agents. This is desirable in a situation where implicit individual agent budgetary constraints make payment of large taxes unrealistic. In this paper, we study a family of social utilities that provide fair allocation (with SoU being subsumed as an extreme case) and derive conditions under which Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation is possible. Furthermore, it is shown how a modification of the above-mentioned mechanism by adding just one message per agent can guarantee full Bayesian implementation, i.e., no extraneous equilibria. We consider the problem of demand-side management in smart grids as a specific motivating application, and through numerical analysis, it is demonstrated that in this application, the proposed method can result in significant gains in fairness of allocation and a reduction in tax variation among agents.
战略代理人公平的激励机制
在网络资源配置的背景下,激励战略主体实现效用总和最大化的机制设计是一个被广泛研究的问题。然而,存在许多感兴趣的网络资源分配问题,在这些问题中,设计人员的目标可能与SoU最大化不同。寻求不同目标的明显原因是,这种效率概念没有考虑到分配的公平性。要求更公平分配的第二个更微妙的原因是,它间接地意味着代理人支付的税收变化更小。在隐性的个体代理人预算约束使得支付大笔税款不现实的情况下,这是可取的。在本文中,我们研究了一系列提供公平分配的社会效用(其中SoU被纳入为极端情况),并推导了贝叶斯和优势策略实施的条件。此外,本文还展示了对上述机制的修改,即每个代理只添加一条消息,就可以保证完全的贝叶斯实现,即没有多余的均衡。我们将智能电网中的需求侧管理问题作为一个具体的激励应用,并通过数值分析表明,在该应用中,所提出的方法可以显著提高分配的公平性,并减少代理之间的税收差异。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
30.00
自引率
4.30%
发文量
234
审稿时长
6 months
期刊介绍: The IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC) is a prestigious journal that covers various topics related to Computer Networks and Communications (Q1) as well as Electrical and Electronic Engineering (Q1). Each issue of JSAC is dedicated to a specific technical topic, providing readers with an up-to-date collection of papers in that area. The journal is highly regarded within the research community and serves as a valuable reference. The topics covered by JSAC issues span the entire field of communications and networking, with recent issue themes including Network Coding for Wireless Communication Networks, Wireless and Pervasive Communications for Healthcare, Network Infrastructure Configuration, Broadband Access Networks: Architectures and Protocols, Body Area Networking: Technology and Applications, Underwater Wireless Communication Networks, Game Theory in Communication Systems, and Exploiting Limited Feedback in Tomorrow’s Communication Networks.
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