{"title":"Controlling Tunnelling through Lending Arrangements: The Disciplining Effect of Lending Arrangements on Value-Diversion, Its Limits and Implications","authors":"A. A. Gözlügöl","doi":"10.54648/eulr2022004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The practices of corporate controllers to divert company value to themselves at the expense of (minority) shareholders and creditors (tunnelling) present a continuing challenge for lawmakers to address. While there is a variety of ways to control selfdealing in public companies, one less studied and appreciated lever against valuediversion is the role of lenders of such companies. This article examines the lending arrangements and common contractual provisions (undertakings, (non-)financial covenants, restrictions), and argues that such arrangements have considerable potential to monitor, deter and restrain value-diversion via self-dealing in the debtor companies. Likely limits to such a potential, and various important factors are also examined. The study concludes with possible implications of such findings.\nTunnelling, self-dealing, related party transactions, value-diversion, creditor protection, lending arrangements, covenants, debtor companies, lenders, creditor discipline","PeriodicalId":53431,"journal":{"name":"European Business Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Business Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eulr2022004","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The practices of corporate controllers to divert company value to themselves at the expense of (minority) shareholders and creditors (tunnelling) present a continuing challenge for lawmakers to address. While there is a variety of ways to control selfdealing in public companies, one less studied and appreciated lever against valuediversion is the role of lenders of such companies. This article examines the lending arrangements and common contractual provisions (undertakings, (non-)financial covenants, restrictions), and argues that such arrangements have considerable potential to monitor, deter and restrain value-diversion via self-dealing in the debtor companies. Likely limits to such a potential, and various important factors are also examined. The study concludes with possible implications of such findings.
Tunnelling, self-dealing, related party transactions, value-diversion, creditor protection, lending arrangements, covenants, debtor companies, lenders, creditor discipline
期刊介绍:
The mission of the European Business Law Review is to provide a forum for analysis and discussion of business law, including European Union law and the laws of the Member States and other European countries, as well as legal frameworks and issues in international and comparative contexts. The Review moves freely over the boundaries that divide the law, and covers business law, broadly defined, in public or private law, domestic, European or international law. Our topics of interest include commercial, financial, corporate, private and regulatory laws with a broadly business dimension. The Review offers current, authoritative scholarship on a wide range of issues and developments, featuring contributors providing an international as well as a European perspective. The Review is an invaluable source of current scholarship, information, practical analysis, and expert guidance for all practising lawyers, advisers, and scholars dealing with European business law on a regular basis. The Review has over 25 years established the highest scholarly standards. It distinguishes itself as open-minded, embracing interests that appeal to the scholarly, practitioner and policy-making spheres. It practices strict routines of peer review. The Review imposes no word limit on submissions, subject to the appropriateness of the word length to the subject under discussion.