{"title":"Financialized Growth and the Structural Power of Finance: Turkey's Debt-Led Growth Regime and Policy Response after the Crisis","authors":"Ayça Zayim","doi":"10.1177/00323292221125566","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes the Turkish central bank's “managed uncertainty” policy after the global financial crisis. During 2010–14, the central bank intentionally generated uncertainty around short-term interest rates, using the level of predictability faced by financiers as a tool to buffer the domestic economy from volatile capital flows. How did the central bank implement this unconventional policy? Building on interview data and public texts, the article argues that the surge in capital inflows after the crisis sourced a debt-led, financialized economic growth model and deepened Turkey's reliance on external financing. The central bank could diverge from the financial sector's policy preferences despite Turkey's increased foreign capital dependence because the availability of low-cost, ample, private funding opportunities temporarily expanded policymakers’ room to maneuver. However, operating vis-à-vis an unsustainable growth regime, the central bank had to revert to orthodoxy in 2014 due to declining investor confidence and capital flight. This article contributes to the literature on the structural power of finance by demonstrating how finance derives its structural power from funding financialized growth, not productive investments. It also shows that financial structural power varies based on the source and cost of external financing beyond the degree of foreign capital dependence.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":"50 1","pages":"543 - 570"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Politics & Society","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292221125566","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
This article analyzes the Turkish central bank's “managed uncertainty” policy after the global financial crisis. During 2010–14, the central bank intentionally generated uncertainty around short-term interest rates, using the level of predictability faced by financiers as a tool to buffer the domestic economy from volatile capital flows. How did the central bank implement this unconventional policy? Building on interview data and public texts, the article argues that the surge in capital inflows after the crisis sourced a debt-led, financialized economic growth model and deepened Turkey's reliance on external financing. The central bank could diverge from the financial sector's policy preferences despite Turkey's increased foreign capital dependence because the availability of low-cost, ample, private funding opportunities temporarily expanded policymakers’ room to maneuver. However, operating vis-à-vis an unsustainable growth regime, the central bank had to revert to orthodoxy in 2014 due to declining investor confidence and capital flight. This article contributes to the literature on the structural power of finance by demonstrating how finance derives its structural power from funding financialized growth, not productive investments. It also shows that financial structural power varies based on the source and cost of external financing beyond the degree of foreign capital dependence.
期刊介绍:
Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.