The politics of grand strategy in an emerging state: a case study on Philippine diplomacy toward China

Abstract

ABSTRACT Some observers expected a drastic change in the Philippines’ diplomacy toward China when Rodrigo Duterte said goodbye to the United States in 2016. However, after six years, the Philippines has remained an allied partner of the United States. The Philippines’ defense establishment bolstered its maritime domain awareness capacity thanks to financial and technical support from the United States. Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) maintained the award from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) favoring the Philippines over China. This paper sheds light on the Philippines’ policymaking process by framing the politics of grand strategy in an emerging state. The grand strategy is an intellectual architecture to clarify the general direction of foreign policy shaped by multiple state actors who are not limited by the foreign affairs office. Neither asymmetrical power relations nor presidential power can dominate the direction of the Philippines’ diplomacy. The president, the DFA, and the defense establishment have developed institutional foundations to craft particular policies. Once they designed the grand strategy in the 1990s, successive policymakers did not remove it but rather incrementally changed it, especially in the 2010s, when they faced a series of assertive actions from China. In an emerging state with limited state capacity, Filipino policymakers do not always coordinate well with each other but still maintain a certain level of autonomy to create particular policies. Against the dominant framework of the weak state, this paper argues that Filipino policymakers demonstrate the state’s capacity to achieve their policy goals, even with limitations.