Roadblocks to Disarmament in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty System

IF 1.1 Q2 LAW
A. Hood
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

For the last five decades, the states parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have come together every 5 years at Review Conferences to explore how they can advance the Treaty’s goals, including the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Despite lengthy negotiations, the Review Conferences have failed to reach a consensus final document as many times as they have succeeded and even when a final document has been agreed it has contained few tangible gains for those working towards a nuclear weapon free world. This state of affairs played out again in 2022 when the NPT’s 10th Review Conference ended without agreement and with many states decrying the weakness of the disarmament provisions that had been under discussion. It has been common in the aftermath of Review Conferences for academics to consider the contemporary political issues that stymied progress. While such studies are important, it is also necessary to consider what deeper structural issues may be at play in preventing the goal of nuclear disarmament from being advanced in the NPT context. To this end, this article identifies and analyses three key structural issues with the NPT and NPT Review Conferences that create difficulties for those pursuing a nuclear disarmament agenda. First, it explores issues with the scope and content of Article VI and how it has been interpreted by the nuclear weapon states. Secondly, it looks at the difficulties that arise from the commitment to achieving consensus outcomes at the Review Conferences and, thirdly, it considers the limitations of who actually attends and contributes to Review Conferences.
核不扩散条约体系中裁军的障碍
在过去的五十年里,《不扩散核武器条约》(不扩散条约)缔约国每五年举行一次审议大会,探讨如何推进《条约》的目标,包括实现核裁军。尽管进行了漫长的谈判,但审议大会多次未能达成协商一致的最后文件,即使达成了最后文件,对那些致力于建立一个无核武器世界的人来说,也几乎没有什么实际成果。2022年,当《不扩散条约》第十次审议大会无协议结束,许多国家谴责正在讨论的裁军条款的弱点时,这种情况再次出现。在审查会议之后,学术界通常会考虑阻碍进展的当代政治问题。虽然这些研究很重要,但也有必要考虑哪些更深层次的结构性问题可能在阻止核裁军目标在《不扩散条约》范围内得到推进方面发挥作用。为此,本文确定并分析了《不扩散条约》和《不扩散核武器条约》审议大会的三个关键结构问题,这些问题给那些寻求核裁军议程的人带来了困难。首先,它探讨了第六条的范围和内容问题,以及核武器国家如何对其进行解释。第二,它着眼于在审查会议上实现协商一致结果的承诺所产生的困难,第三,它考虑到谁真正出席审查会议并为审查会议作出贡献的局限性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
25.00%
发文量
33
期刊介绍: The Journal of Conflict & Security Law is a thrice yearly refereed journal aimed at academics, government officials, military lawyers and lawyers working in the area, as well as individuals interested in the areas of arms control law, the law of armed conflict (international humanitarian law) and collective security law. The Journal covers the whole spectrum of international law relating to armed conflict from the pre-conflict stage when the issues include those of arms control, disarmament, and conflict prevention and discussions of the legality of the resort to force, through to the outbreak of armed conflict when attention turns to the coverage of the conduct of military operations and the protection of non-combatants by international humanitarian law.
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